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A RATIONALE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JOHN A. BAUMANt
I
Praise of the effectiveness of the motion for summary judgment in
eliminating spurious claims and sham defenses-has been widespread and
even extravagant.' The more dismal picture of a procedure erroneously
invoked in a considerable number of cases has failed to capture the atten-
tion of the commentators.2 This is surprising, since the incorrect use of
the summary judgment procedure obviously increases delay and expense
in the final disposition of litigation and thus aggravates the very problem
the procedure was devised to solve. If summary judgment is to retain its
effectiveness as a procedure for speedy settlement of sham litigation,
recognition of the limitations imposed upon its use by the Anglo-Amer-
ican system of procedure is essential. These limitations result directly
from a basic postulate of the procedural law that issues of fact shall be
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University. Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of
Law, Columbia University.
1. Asbill and Snell, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rides-When an Isst
of Fact is Presented, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 1143 (1953) ; Bush, Summary Judgment in Cali-
fornia, 36 Com. L.J. 569 (1931) ; CLARK, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS, A PROPOSED RULE OF
COURT, THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS, SERIES A. (collected) 19 (1942) ;
Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567 (1952); Ritter and Magnuson,
The Motion for Summary Judgment and Its Extension to all Classes of Actions, 21
MARQ. L. REv. 33 (1936); Sheintag, Sunnmary Judgment, 4 FORDHAzo L. REV. 186
(1935). Note, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 370 (1956).
2. For statistics in state courts, consult NEW YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 20TH AN-
NUAL REPORT (1954) pp. 97, 117, 125, and 140; WISCONSIN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1957 Bi-
ENNIAL REPORT, Table 8, pp. E-41-E-47. Statistics in the federal courts are even more
revealing, not because of the percentage of cases in which the motion was denied, but be-
cause of the extremely limited application of the motion. Thus in the fiscal year 1956,
2,125 cases were terminated in the southern district of California, but in only 26 cases
was a summary judgment requested, and of these 26 motions, 8 were denied; in the
northern district of Illinois, 2,683 cases were terminated, 48 motions for summary judg-
ment were filed of which 22 were denied; in Massachusetts, 1,480 cases were terminated,
39 motions were made and 14 were denied; and in the eastern district of Pennsylvania,
2,406 cases were terminated, 29 motions were filed and 7 were denied. (Statistics were
provided through the courtesy of Mr. Will Shaforth, Chief of the Division of Pro-
cedural Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts.)
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
resolved only after a trial.' Acceptance of this postulate means that the
rules governing the summary judgment procedure must assure against
encroachment upon a litigant's right to trial of disputed propositions of
fact. Thus it has been stated that the essence of the theory underlying
a motion for summary judgment is ". . . that there is no genuine issue
of material fact to be resolved by the trier of the facts, and that the
movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established
facts."4
Since the existence of genuine issues of fact is the much mooted
question raised when the summary judgment procedure is invoked, only
a moment's reflection reveals that difficulty will arise in determining
when there are "established facts." Once an agreement between the
parties is reached as to the facts, the application of the summary judgment
procedure presents little difficulty. Thus if facts are established either
by pleadings,5 or by stipulations and agreed statements of facts,6 the only
problem left for the court's decision is the determination of the controlling
law, an admittedly judicial function. There are literally hundreds of cases
3. Bauman, The Evolutio* of the Summary Judgment Procedure, 31 IND. L.J. 329,
346-47 (1956).
4. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.04[2], at 2032 (1953).
5. Fletcher v. Bryan, 175 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Fletcher v. Norfolk News-
papers, 239 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Gentila v. Pace, 193 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943 (1952) ; Person v. United States, 112 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 672 (1940); Ford v. Hahn, 269 App. Div. 436, 55 N.Y.S.2d 854
(1st Dep't 1945).
6. United States v. Ryan, 124 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1954) ; Parks v. Atlanta
Printing Pressmen, 248 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Habel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 F.2d
337 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Walter W. Johnson Co. v. R.F.C., 230 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 832 (1956) ; Branson v. Fawcett Publications, 124 F. Supp. 429
(E.D. Ill. 1954); Parke Davis & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 207 F.2d 571 (6th
Cir. 1953) (interrogatories, agreement that no issue of fact remains). A stipulation that
the case should be decided on a motion for summary judgment, as distinguished from a
stipulation of the facts of the case, is, of course, not an adequate basis for granting a
summary judgment. Tucker, Bronson & Martin v. United Supply & Mfg. Co., 102 F.
Supp. 805 (W.D. La. 1952). Equally ineffective are agreements reached by counsel
that leave important factual questions disputed by the parties. Emerson v. National
Cylinder Gas Co., 135 F. Supp. 268 (D. Mass. 1955). Even though the parties agree as
to the facts, a summary judgment will be denied in cases where the public interest is
best served by a full hearing. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Electric Prod.
Co., 179 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1950) (patent); Rea v. Rea, 124 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C.
1954) (divorce); Hycon Manufacturing Co. v. H. Koch & Sons, 219 F.2d 353 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1954) (patent). Agreement may result from
express admissions made at the request of an opponent. See United States v. Adelman,
10 F.R.D. 417 (W.D. Mo. 1950). This problem is considered infra at note 141. Also
to be distinguished are a group of cases in which the facts are determined by an admin-
istrative agency prior to review of the dispute in the courts. In such cases, factual dis-
putes may be eliminated, leaving for judicial determination only a question of law. Ex-
amples are: Minkoff v. Payne, 210 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Murray v. Folsom, 147
F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1957) ; United States v. Stangland, 242 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1957) ;
United States v. Watkins, 147 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Ark. 1957) ; M. H. Renken Dairy
Co. v. Wickard, 45 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
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in which a court, on a motion for summary judgment, is called upon
to resolve an issue of law involving the construction or effect of a written
instrument, such as an insurance policy,' contract,' deed,9 judgment,"0 or
will ;" or the application of a statute or regulation to agreed facts.' In
these cases the court will frequently expressly state that the parties are not
in dispute as to the facts, but only as to the applicable law.
Unquestionably the summary judgment procedure performs a useful
7. Sterneck v. Equitable Life Insurance Co., 237 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Wibble-
man v. Home Ins. Co., 194 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Lloyd v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.,
245 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Kelly v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp.
539 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v.
Woody, 47 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1942); Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1951) ; Schifter v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 183 Misc. 74, 50
N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 706, 54 N.Y.S.2d 408 (2d Dep't
1945).
8. General Phoenix Corp. v. Cabot, 300 N.Y. 87, 89 N.E.2d 238 (1949); Spry v.
Chicago Ry. Equipment Co., 298 Ill. App. 471, 19 N.E.2d 122 (1939) ; Dale v. Preg, 204
F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Repsold v. New York Life Ins. Co., 216 F.2d 479 (7th Cir.
1954) ; Severson v. Fleck, 148 F. Supp. 760 (D.N. Dak. 1957) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
Turner Construction Co., 2 N.Y.2d 456, 141 N.E.2d 590 (1957) ; cf. Huffman v. Ford
Motor Co., 195 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (collective bargain-
ing agreement) ; Columbia Hospital v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 188 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951) (bond) ; Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Gordon, 244 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1957) (effect of a written agreement).
9. Coutts v. J. L. Kraft & Bros. Co., 119 Misc. 260, 196 N.Y. Supp. 135 (Sup. Ct.
1922), aff'd, 206 App. Div. 625, 198 N.Y. Supp. 908 (2d Dep't 1923) ; McHenry v. Ford
Motor Co., 146 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1956) ; Carrothers v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,
134 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Tex. 1955) ; Wier v. Texas Co., 180 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1950) ; cf.
Gibson v. Security Trust Co., 201 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1953) (trust) ; Star Apartment v.
Martin, 204 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1953) (land contract) ; Fife v. Barnard, 186 F.2d 655
(10th Cir. 1951) (quiet title action).
10. Lyle v. Bangor & Aroostook R. R., 237 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 913 (1956) ; A.B.C. Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 122
F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Fletcher v. Norstad, 205 F.2d 896 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 877 (1953) ; Williams v. Great Western Sugar Co., 126 Colo. 497, 251 P.2d 912
(1953).
11. Board of National Missions v. Smith, 182 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Sedgwick
v. National Savings & Trust Co., 130 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Wright v. Wright,
154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
12. State ex rel. Salvesen v. City of Milwaukee, 249 Wis. 351, 24 N.W.2d 630
(1946) (civil service regulation) ; Maghan v. Board of Comm'rs of District of Colum-
bia, 141 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (ibid.) ; Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church, 210
F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1953) ; Beedy v. Washington
Water Power Co., 238 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1956) (workmen's compensation act) ; Brod-
rick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955) (internal revenue code) ; Dillard v. Thomp-
son, 5 F.R.D. 26 (W.D. La. 1945) (F.E.L.A.) ; Western Mercantile Co. v. United
States, 111 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (Federal Tort Claims Act) ; Ryan v. Scog-
gin, 245 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1957) (Civil Rights Act); Ginsberg v. Centennial Turf
Club, 126 Colo. 471, 251 P.2d 926 (1952) (validity of statute authorizing pari-mutual
betting). The application of the statute of limitations to agreed facts has been a par-
ticularly effective area for the operation of the summary judgment procedure. Burns
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 100 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Mo. 1951), aff'd, 192 F.2d
472 (8th Cir. 1951); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp, 229 F.2d 714 (7th
Cir. 1956) ; Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 211 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Lewitsky v.
Matson Navigation Co., 134 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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function in this area, though it may be noted in passing that such pro-
cedural devices as the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the agreed
case, and stipulation practice were generally available to litigants in most
states prior to the adoption of the summary judgment pradice. It may
certainly be said that the reform attempted by the institution of a sum-
mary judgment procedure was not directed toward situations where the
parties themselves could arrive at an agreement as to the facts, and any
beneficial effect in this area is simply the peripheral result of the new
procedural device."
The problem the summary judgment procedure attempts to solve
arises when apparently genuine issues of fact are raised by the pleadings
and when, consequently, the parties are not in agreement as to the factual
basis of the dispute. The function of the motion for summary judgment
is to determine if these apparent issues of fact raised by the pleadings are
worthy of trial. If it is found that a trial will prove to be merely a
formality because the decision must, as a matter of law, be for one
party, the cost and delays of trial are to be eliminated as a matter of
social policy and judicial economy. Thus the rules or statutes establish-
ing a summary judgment procedure require the granting of the motion
unless the existence of a "good defense,"14 or a "triable issue,"'1 or a
"genuine issue of fact"1 " is established. The imposition of the burden
of establishing that such issues do or do not exist presents one of the most
complex aspects of the summary judgment procedure.
To clarify the nature of the problem presented by the use of the sum-
mary judgment procedure, a comparison may be made with ordinary trial
procedure. In ordinary litigation, the parties formulate issues of fact by
pleadings or at pre-trial conferences. At the trial, the party upon whom
the law imposes the burden of proof has the duty of coming forward with
evidence and the further burden of persuading the tribunal that the dis-
puted material propositions of fact have been proved by a preponderance
of the evidence or whatever other quantum of proof the applicable law
13. Bauman, supra note 3.
14. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 110, § 181 (1949). The rule was subsequently changed in
Illinois by the adoption of Federal Rule 56. See ILL. REV. STAT. C. 110, § 57 (1955).
For a collection of statutes in the various states, see Korn and Paley, Survey of Sum-
mary Judgment, Judgment on the PIcadings and Related Pre-trial Procedures, 42 COR-
NELL L.Q. 483 (1957); FIRST PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CO1MITTEE ON
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1957 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS,
NEW YORK, pp. 319-26.
15. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 437(c).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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requires. This latter burden is frequently described as the risk of non-
persuasion.
17
The summary judgment procedure ordinarily has no effect on the
issue formulation stage of litigation, although Federal Rule 56 does per-
mit a defendant to move for summary judgment without pleading an
answer." Significant changes are made, however, in the process of proof
and persuasion. As stated above, the procedural law generally imposes on
the party who supports the affirmative of an issue the burden of coming
forward with evidence to establish propositions controverted by an oppos-
ing party's pleadings, and the further burden of establishing these proposi-
tions by a preponderance of the evidence. While these same two burdens
are found in summary judgment proceedings, neither the imposition of
the burdens nor the technique of satisfying them is the same.
Assuming that the party moving for summary judgment is the party
upon whom rests the affirmative of an issue of fact, it would seem that
he should be required to produce at least the same quantum of proof in
support of his claim or defense as is required by the procedural law
in an ordinary trial. Interestingly enough, the original provisions of
IKeating's Act, which restricted summary judgment to plaintiffs suing on
commercial paper, had no such requirement.' 9 The specially indorsed writ
copied the bill of exchange which was the basis of the lawsuit, and no
other proof was required as a basis for the motion. The Rules adopted
pursuant to the Judicature Act of 1873 and 1875 added the requirement
that a plaintiff verify the cause of action by affidavit and swear that
there exists no defense to the action.2" Thus in English practice the
special indorsement of the writ pursuant to Order III, rule 6, verified in
general terms by affidavit, supplies the proof needed to form the basis
of the motion for judgment.2
In the United States when issues of fact are formed by the plead-
ings, summary judgment procedures require the moving party to support
his claim or defense with evidence.22 As the New York Court of Appeals
17. Note, MORGAN, MAGUIRE, AND WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
406-08 (4th ed. 1957) ; Michael and Adler, The Trial of a Issue of Facrt, 34 COLUm. L.
REV. 1224, 1255-59 (1934) ; 9 WIGIIORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485-2489 (3d ed. 1940).
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
19. 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67 (1855).
20. 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, Rule 7, and 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77, Order XIV.
21. ODGERS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE 58 (15th ed., Harwood 1955).
22. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13[3] (1953). Statute and rules are col-
lected in FIRST PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 14, at pp. 324-25. Federal Rule 56 permits a party to
move for a summary judgment without affidavits, but the motion is then "functionally
equivalent to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE § 56.1112], at 2063 (1953).
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stated in the leading case of Curry v. M1lackenzie,2" on a motion for
summary judgment ". . . there must be supporting affidavits proving
the cause of action, and that clearly and completely, by affiants who
speak with knowledge." Absent such evidence, the motion will be denied,
not because the opposing party has produced controverting evidence
raising a genuine issue of fact, but simply because there has been a failure
of proof on the proponent's part.2 4 To this extent, the burden of proof
rule in summary judgment is analogous to the burden of proof rule in
the regular trial procedure.
Unlike regular trial procedure, however, the party moving for a
summary judgment has an initial burden of producing evidence that does
not merely preponderate, but is sufficient to permit a favorable ruling
as a matter of law. 5 Whether or not the evidence presented has attained
this desired degree of persuasiveness is an issue of crucial importance.
Since this same issue may be raised in a trial by a motion for judgment,
for a directed verdict, or by other motions having an identical function,
it is instructive to turn again to a consideration of the regular trial
procedure.
In trial practice, a defendant moving for a directed verdict relies
either on an absence of proof of some essential element of the plaintiff's
case, or he argues that although there is some evidence favoring the
plaintiff it is of such slight probative force that reasonable men can
reach but one conclusion.2" Infinite variations of this latter standard
23. 239 N.Y. 267, 269-70, 146 N.E. 375 (1925).
24. See also Mettler v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 107 F. Supp. 194, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1952)
("It is, however, an entirely different proposition to contend, as the plaintiff does here,
that general denials should be disregarded where the only basis for the plaintiff's claim
is that contained in general allegations of his complaint, unsupported by any facts shown
by affidavits or depositions.") ; Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Bostwick Laboratories, 181 F.2d
315 (2d Cir. 1950) ("sketchy record" prevented summary disposition) ; Goldman v.
Summerfield, 214 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (defendant-movant) ; Anderson v. United
States, 182 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1950) ; Kelliher v. Kelliher, 101 Cal. App. 2d 226, 225 P.2d
554 (1950) ; Gellens v. Continental Bank & Trust Co. of New York, 241 App. Div. 591,
272 N.Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dep't 1934) ; Berick v. Curran, 55 R.I. 193, 179 Ati. 708
(1935). The moving party must also comply with all the procedural pre-requisites of
the motion in order to succeed. Jacobs v. Korpus, 128 Misc. 445, 218 N.Y. Supp. 314
(Sup. Ct. 1926) (failure to verify defeats the motion).
25. See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). It was by the
application of this standard that attacks on the constitutionality of the summary judg-
ment procedure were forestalled. See Dwan v. Massarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 192
N.Y. Supp. 577 (1st Dep't 1922) ; Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N.Y. Supp.
43 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724 (1923) ; Eisele v. Raphael, 90
N.J.L. 219, 101 Atl. 200 (1917) ; People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co.,
250 Mich. 273, 230 N.W. 170 (1930); Cowan Oil & Refining Co. v. Miley Petroleum
Corp., 112 Cal. App. (Supp.) 773, 295 Pac. 504 (1931).
26. BLU-mE, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 414-18 (1955); 9 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE
§ 2495 (3d ed. 1940) ; Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MIcH.
L. REV. 555, 574 (1950). In court tried cases, there is an equivalent test. See Blume, id.
§§ 9-24, at 421; 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 41.13[3] and [4], at 1043 (2d ed. 1951).
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are found in the cases, but most courts have adopted a formula which
excludes not only the idea of weighing evidence but even the consideration
of rebutting evidence. 7 If, on the other hand, the party moving for a
directed verdict is the proponent of an issue (either the plaintiff, or the
defendant who relies on an affirmative defense) a much more difficult
question is presented. To direct for the proponent means that issues of
credibility have been resolved favorably for him. Since many courts
hold that the credibility of testimonial evidence is for the jury, directed
verdicts are generally denied to a proponent of proof except in cases
where the supporting evidence is documentary.28
Thus in trial practice, when a defendant moves for the peremptory
instruction of a verdict, the court at least purports to look only to the
evidence of his adversary (the plaintiff) to determine if some element
of proof is missing or, what amounts to the same thing, that the evidence
produced is such that reasonable men could not find for the plaintiff on
some material element of the case. On the other hand, when the proponent
of the proof moves for a directed verdict, his own evidence must be
evaluated for credibility, and the court then must not only accept this
evidence as true, but also decide that reasonable men could only find
that it is true.
Applying the directed verdict standards to the original types of
cases in which summary judgment was authorized is illuminating."9 Only
the plaintiff was permitted to move for judgment and only in cases
involving bills of exchange, promissory notes, and checks. In these
cases, the plaintiff was capable of supporting his claim by documentary
evidence, and hence the court was willing to resolve the issue of the
authenticity of the document in favor of the plaintiff in the absence of
controverting evidence from the defendant. Granting a motion for
summary judgment in such cases is thus consistent with the decisions of
courts upholding directed verdicts in cases where a proponent moves
27. FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 241, 281-82 (1949); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2495 (3d ed. 1940); cf. Blume,
Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, supra note 26, at 581.
28. Sunderland, Directing a Verdict for the Party Having the Burden of Proof, 11
MIcH. L. REV. 198 (1913) ; Bobbe, The Uncontradicted Testimony of an Interested Wit-
ness, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 33 (1934); Rothschild, Sumnnary Judicial Power, 19 CORNELL
L.Q. 361 (1934) ; see also 9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2495, at 305 (3d ed. 1940).
No definite relationship can be established between the standards used to direct a
verdict for a proponent and the standard used in the disposition of motions for summary
judgment. A partial explanation may be found in the fact that few cases can be found
in which a verdict is directed for a proponent, and, in addition, the area in which the
motion for a directed verdict operates is now preempted by the summary judgment
procedure.
29. See Bauman, supra note 3, at 338 and 350.
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for a ruling as a matter of law on the basis of unimpeached documents.
The willingness of the courts to resolve issues of credibility in favor
of the proponent in these cases finds its support in the reliability of the
evidence available to the moving party to prove his case. Since summary
judgment was restricted to cases involving bills of exchange, the sup-
porting evidence, classified by Bentham as pre-appointed, 0 consisted of a
document prepared prior to trial by both parties to embody their agree-
ment in the event that any dispute should arise. Participation by both
parties in the preparation and execution of the document lent it a high
degree of credibility." To discredit such documentary evidence, the
opposing party was properly required to produce some affirmative
evidence. If such evidence was not presented at the hearing of the
motion, it was assumed that none was available and that the document
was valid and provided a proper evidentiary basis for a summary judg-
ment.
Thus the postulate upon which rested the decisions of the cases
arising under Keating's Act was that the plaintiff's assertions were to
be accepted as true in the absence of controverting evidence. After the
extension of the procedure to other categories of contract and creditor
relationships, discrimination in the application of this basic principle was
necessary. In these new types of cases, the transaction that forms the
basis of the plaintiff's claim may never have been memorialized in a
document. Even in cases where documentary evidence is available, it may
not be sufficient in itself to establish the claim or defense; and, moreover,
the well known statutory presumptions that ease the burdens of proof
in the negotiable instrument cases are not available. Furthermore, in
cases where documentary evidence exists, the methods of preparing the
document may differ from the negotiable instrument cases, since in
claims on accounts, for example, the document is prepared by only one
party.
32
The extension of summary judgment to new categories of cases
thus led to a careful examination of the proof that the moving party was
required to produce in support of his claim or defense. Given the judicial
30. 2 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, Book 4, c. 1, 435-53 (1827) ;
BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 31, at 19 (12th ed., Phipson 1922).
31. BENTHAm, AN INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE RATIONALE OF EVIDENCE, C. 15, pp.
68-71, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREmy BENTHA-M (Bowring ed. 1843) ; 1 MOORE, A TREATISE
ON FACTS OR THE WEIGHT AND VALUE OF EVIDENCE § 11-12, at 17 (1908).
32. 3 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, Book 6, c. 2, § 1-2, 405-24
(1827).
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bias in favor of pre-appointed evidence,3" it is not surprising that the courts
in examining the moving papers extend the postulate of Keating's Act to
cover the new types of claims or defenses as long as the supporting proof
is in the form of undisputed documents.34 Thus the typical case in which a
summary judgment is granted involves a negotiable instrument, 5 contract, 6
lease,3" insurance policy,8 book account, 9 or some defense such as release,4"
33. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Hanson v. Halvor-
son, 247 Wis. 434, 437, 19 N.W.2d 882 (1945) ("Hardly ever can a summary judgment
be granted upon affidavits unless the issue raised by the pleadings undeniably depends
upon documents set forth by copy in the affidavit of the moving party which are not
impeached by an opposing affidavit.") ; Lederer v. Wise Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 459, 464,
12 N.E.2d 544 (1938) (there is no reason to restrict summary judgment ". . . where a
legal defense is established by documentary evidence or official record and there is no
issue about the verity or conclusiveness of the proof."). For examples of defenses
established by documentary proof, see notes 40-43 infra, and Robinson v. Henderson,
145 F. Supp. 463 (D.D.C. 1956) (diplomatic immunity); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis.
334, 6 N.W.2d 212 (1942) (charitable immunity); Hurd v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 181
F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1950) (indispensable party).
34. Proof may actually be in the form of affidavits to comply with the govern-
ing procedural rules, see 1957 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COaMISSION ON CouRTs, NEW
YORK, op. cit. supra note 14, pp. 324-25, but the point is that at a trial documentary evi-
dence would be available in support of the claim or defense. This was particularly true
of the cases arising under Keating's Act. See note 19 supra. No precise definition of
"documentary evidence" is made in the cases, but apparently included are any writings
prepared prior to the litigation in the ordinary conduct of affairs, as distinguished from
affidavits and depositions prepared solely for use at trial. See cases cited note 49 infra.
35. General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N.Y. 133, 139
N.E. 216 (1923); Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N.Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't
1922), affd, 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724 (1923) ; Nutrena Mills v. Greer, 114 F. Supp.
156 (S.D. Mo. 1953); cf. United States v. Jones, 155 F. Supp. 52 (M.D. Ga. 1957)
(guaranty) ; Brown v. C. Rosenstein Co., 120 Misc. 787, 200 N.Y. Supp. 491 (Sup. Ct.
1923), aff'd, 208 App. Div. 799, 203 N.Y. Supp. 922 (1st Dep't 1924) (letter of credit).
36. Mione Acres v. Chatmas Orchards, 277 App. Div. 425, 100 N.Y.S.2d 963 (3d
Dep't 1950); Lindley v. Robillard, 208 Misc. 532, 144 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
McDonald v. Amsterdam Bldg. Co., 232 App. Div. 382, 251 N.Y. Supp. 494 (3d Dep't
1931), aff'd, 259 N.Y. 533, 182 N.E. 169 (1932); Wilbur-Dolson Silk Co. v. William
Wallach Co., 206 App. Div. 470, 201 N.Y. Supp. 465 (1st Dep't 1923); Gummed Tapes
v. Miller, 155 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
37. Wainscott v. Penikoff, 287 Ill. App. 78, 4 N.E.2d 511 (1936); Killian v. Wel-
fare Engineering Co., 328 Ill. App. 375, 66 N.E.2d 305 (1946) ; Maltz v. Daly, 120
Misc. 466, 198 N.Y. Supp. 690 (1st Dep't 1923).
38. Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 225 App. Div. 781, 232 N.Y. Supp. 280
(4th Dep't 1928), aff'd, 251 N.Y. 44, 166 N.E. 798 (1929) ; Cleghorn v. Ocean Accident
& Guarantee Corp., 216 App. Div. 342, 215 N.Y. Supp. 127 (2d Dep't 1926), modified, 244
N.Y. 166, 155 N.E. 87 (1926).
39. Manhattan Paper Co. v. Bayer, 147 Misc. 227, 263 N.Y. Supp. 720 (Sup. Ct.
1931) (account stated); Henry W. Cooke Co. v. Sheldon, 53 R.I. 101, 164 Atl. 327
(1933) (book account) ; Sea Modes v. Cohen, 309 N.Y. 1, 127 N.E.2d 723 (1955) (ac-
count stated); Rosenthal v. Halsband, 51 R.I. 119, 152 Atl. 320 (1930) (book account
and note) ; Walker v. Woods, 334 Ill. App. 619, 79 N.E.2d 533 (1948) (account stated).
40. Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (1954) ; Favole v. Gallo,
263 App. Div. 729, 30 N.Y.S.2d 878 (2d Dep't 1941), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 696, 45 N.E.2d 456
(1942) ; Schoenfeld v. Modern Silver Linen Supply Co., 279 App. Div. 49, 107 N.Y.S.2d
861 (1st Dep't 1951).
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accord and satisfaction,41 res judicata,4 2 or the statute of limitations.43 The
willingness of the courts to accept the proof presented in support of the mo-
tion accounts for the success of summary judgment in this area. If contro-
verting evidence is not produced in opposition to the motion, summary judg-
ment is granted on the assumption that no dispute exists as to the facts.44
The acceptance of the trustworthiness of documents may be justified
as previously shown, but the use of all types of documentary evidence
raises problems that did not occur in the litigation involving bills of
exchange. When a promissory note is the basis of the action, the claim
is embodied in the document. Granting its authenticity, the instrument
itself establishes the cause of action. Once summary judgment became
available in other types of cases, additional problems are presented since
even if the document is unimpeached, it may not prove the material facts
of the claim or defense. For example, in a stockholder's derivative action
against a bank for an alleged wrongful expenditure of money in settling
a claim, defendant, in moving for a summary judgment, produced the
corporate minute book showing that the directors approved the payment.
Summary judgment was denied because the document, although accepted
as a true record, merely established the fact of the expenditure and not
its propriety. 5 Thus the party opposing the motion may not only attack
the authenticity of the document, but may also contend that the document
is not probative of the issue raised by the pleadings, a possibility not
available to the opponent in cases arising under Keating's Act.46 More-
41. Short v. J. R. Watkins Co., 122 F. Supp. 244 (D. Minn. 1954) ; Kirschbaum v.
Dauman, 261 App. Div. 998, 26 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dep't 1941), rearg. denied, 262 App.
Div. 747, 28 N.Y.S.2d 156 (2d Dep't 1941).
42. Taylor v. Marcelle, 97 F. Supp. 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 759 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 935 (1952) ; Riley v. Southern Transp. Co., 278 App.
Div. 605, 101 N.Y.S.2d 906 (3d Dep't 1951); Chapman v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 769
(W.D. Mo. 1957).
43. Chance v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 173 Misc. 754, 20 N.Y.S.2d 635
(Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 257 App. Div. 1006, 13 N.Y.S.2d 785 (2d Dep't 1939), aff'd, 282
N.Y. 656, 26 N.E.2d 802 (1940) ; Miller v. International Freighting Corp., 97 F. Supp.
60 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; Robinson v. Orem, 198 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Silva v. Sandia
Corp., 246 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1957) ; Brensinger v. Margaret Ann Super Markets, 192
F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1951) (laches).
44. See cases cited notes 35-43 supra, and text at note 88 infra.
45. Levine v. Behn, 282 N.Y. 120, 25 N.E.2d 871 (1940).
46. Colonial Airlines v. Janos, 202 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1953) (accord and satisfac-
tion) ; Zimmer v. Whiting-Buick, Inc., 274 App. Div. 967, 84 N.Y.S.2d 839 (4th Dep't
1948) (scope of a release); Lucio v. Curran, 284 App. Div. 1039, 135 N.Y.S.2d 880
(1st Dep't 1954) (release); Freedman v. Maguire, 110 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
modified, 111 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (release and account stated) ; White v. Mer-
chants Despatch Transp. Co., 256 App. Div. 1044, 10 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1st Dep't 1940)
(corporate books) ; Luisoni v. Barth, 2 Misc. 2d 315, 137 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(letter). Compare Dumont v. Raymond, 49 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1944), affd, 269 App.
Div. 592, 56 N.Y.S.2d 592 (3d Dep't 1945), with Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103
(Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 292
N.Y. 552, 54 N.E.2d 683 (1944).
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over, the documentary evidence in the new types of cases is not rigidly
circumscribed in form as is a negotiable instrument, but may be open
to varying interpretations. Thus parol evidence may be needed to resolve
the ambiguities in the document, and if this evidence is either conflicting
or involves issues of credibility, as it frequently does in contractual ar-
rangements, summary judgment must be denied." Lastly, the term
"documentary evidence" is itself imprecise, and thus in a state such as
New York where a defendant may move for summary judgment in any
case where a defense is established by documents,4" disputes may arise
as to the proper classification of the supporting proof.49
Once a court decides that documentary evidence does establish the
claim or defense, a summary judgment will be granted if the opponent
fails to produce controverting evidence."0 Thus in these cases, the burden
of producing evidence attacking the verity and conclusiveness of the
supporting evidence is shifted to the party opposing the motion. Because
of the great value attached to documentary evidence by the courts,
particularly in cases where the document resulted from mutual negotiation,
as a contract or note, or from mutual commercial transactions, as an
47. Piedmont Hotel Co. v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 263 N.Y. 25, 188 N.E. 145 (1933)
(lease) ; Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (con-
tract) ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Aconomy Erectors, 224 F.2d 242 (7th
Cir. 1955) (insurance policy) ; Gulf Power Co. v. Local Union Nos. 676 & 1078, 229
F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1956) (collective bargaining contract) ; Brawer v. Mendelson Bros.
Factors, 262 N.Y. 53, 186 N.E. 200, amended, 262 N.Y. 562, 188 N.E. 65 (1933) (mean-
ing of "credit checking") ; Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 164 F.2d 770 (2d
Cir. 1947) (dealer's franchise); Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 116 P.2d 62 (1941)
(settlement agreement) ; Burns v. Jaffe, 148 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (contract).
Problems of interpretation are even more acute when a contract is oral. See Cary
v. U.S. Hoffman Machinery Corp., 148 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1957).
48. N.Y.R. CIv. PRAC. 113.
49. Chance v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, supra note 43 (approving a very
liberal definition of documentary evidence) ; Dietch v. Atlas, 140 N.Y.S.2d 859, 862
(Sup. Ct. 1955). See also Schusterman v. C. & F. Caterers, 192 Misc. 564, 77 N.Y.S.2d
718 (City Ct. 1948) (letter and agreement in writing) ; White v. Merchants Despatch
Trans. Co., supra note 46 (corporate books) ; Luisoni v. Barth, supra note 46 (letter) ;
Metropolitan Fuel Distributors v. Coogan, 277 App. Div. 138, 97 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1st Dep't
1950) (covenant in a lease); Schoenfeld v. Modern Silver Linen Supply Co., supra
note 40 (written agreement); Bruhn v. Klein, 138 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (af-
fidavit raising defense of the statute of frauds) ; cf. Brennan v. Plattsburgh Pub. Co.,
1 App. Div. 2d 740, 146 N.Y.S.2d 764 (3d Dep't 1955) (deposition is not documentary
evidence).
50. See cases cited notes 35-43, 49 supra; City of Zephyrhills, Florida v. R. E.
Crummer & Co., 237 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1956) (note) ; U.S. v. Atlantic Basin Shipyard,
124 F. Supp. 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (discharge in bankruptcy) ; Northern Pacific Ry. v.
Associated Gen. Contractors, 152 F. Supp. 126 (D.N. Dak. 1957) (bill of lading and
admission). English law provides defendant with the alternative of paying the amount
of the claim into court as a condition for obtaining leave to defend. 18 & 19 VIcT., c.
67, § 2 (1855) ; 38 & 39 VICT., c. 77, Order XIV, Rule 6; see Blaiberg v. Abrams, 77
L. T. Journal 255 (C.A. 1884) ; In re Ford, [1900] 2 Q.B. 211.
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account, a high standard of proof is exacted." This has led one writer
to conclude, after a factual study of 250 New York cases, that the
"judges weigh probabilities."5 2 This is true in the sense that judges will
not permit the authenticity of documents to be attacked by mere con-
clusions or generalizations. 3 Since the litigation concerns transactions
in which the opponent participated or shares full knowledge, a mere
repetition of pleaded denials fails to establish a triable issue of fact.54
Equally ineffective is evidence inadmissible at a trial. Thus summary
judgment will not be defeated by an opponent who relies on hearsay
evidence5 or proof varying the terms of a written contract.5"
On the other hand, the opponent of the motion may produce docu-
ments, affidavits, or depositions containing detailed evidence directly
contradicting the moving party's assertions,57 or supporting some such
51. See Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N.Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't 1922),
aff'd, 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724 (1934) ; Ulibarri v. Christenson, sitpra note 40; W. E.
Plechaty Co. v. Heckett Engineering, 145 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ohio 1956) (affidavits
"cannot change what the . . . patent discloses") ; Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. Mc-
Carthy, 295 Mass. 597, 4 N.E.2d 450, 107 A.L.R. 1215 (1936).
52. Cohen, Smnmary Judgment in New York, 32 COLUMf. L. REV. 825, 853 n.38
(1932). Compare the statement of the English rule in ODGERS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE
66 (15th ed. Harwood 1955).
53. Tractor & Equipment Corp. v. Chain Belt Co., 276 App. Div. 551, 96 N.Y.S.2d
71 (1st Dep't 1950) ; McAnsh v. Blauner, 222 App. Div. 381, 226 N.Y. Supp. 379 (1st
Dep't 1928), aff'd, 248 N.Y. 537, 162 N.E. 515 (1928) ; Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334,
6 N.W.2d 212 (1942); People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich.
273, 230 N.W. 170, 69 A.L.R. 1024 (1930); Bertolf Bros. v. Leuthardt, 261 App. Div.
981, 26 N.Y.S.2d 114 (2d Dep't 1941); Dodwell & Co. v. Silverman, 234 App. Div. 362,
254 N.Y. Supp. 746 (1st Dep't 1932); Rodger v. Bliss, 130 Misc. 168, 223 N.Y. Supp.
401 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ; Rosenthal v. Halsband, 51 R.I. 119, 123, 152 Atl. 320 (1930).
54. General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N.Y. 133, 139
N.E. 216 (1923) ; Bower v. M. Samuels & Co., 226 App. Div. 769, 234 N.Y. Supp. 379
(2d Dep't 1929), aff'd, 252 N.Y. 549, 170 N.E. 138 (1929) ; Lee v. Graubard, 205 App.
Div. 344, 199 N.Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1923) ; Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park
Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636, 39 A.L.R. 74 (1925) ; see Combined Bronx Amuse-
ments v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 132 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
55. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.635(2) (1957) ; Ernst
Seidelman Corp. v. Mollison, 10 F.R.D. 426 (S.D. Ohio 1950) ; Seward v. Nissen, 2 F.R.D.
545 (D. Del. 1942) ; Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Irving Trust
Co. v. Orvis, 139 Misc. 670, 248 N.Y. Supp. 771 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Staten Island Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co. v. Buccello, 2 Misc. 2d 1020, 146 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ;
Moe v. Bank of the United States, 211 App. Div. 519, 207 N.Y. Supp. 347 (2d Dep't
1925).
56. Birgbauer v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 251 Mich. 614, 232 N.W. 403 (1930):
Lion Brewery of New York City v. Loughran, 223 App. Div. 623, 229 N.Y. Supp. 216
(1st Dep't 1928) ; In re Lyman Richey Sand & Gravel Co., 42 F. Supp. 158 (D. Neb.
1941), appeal disnissed sub now., O'Leary v. Curtis, 129 F.2d 1021 (8th Cir. 1942), rev'd
in part, 131 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Ford v. Luria Steel & Trading Corp., 192 F.2d 880
(8th Cir. 1951).
57. Dwan v. Massarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 192 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1st Dep't 1922)
(conditional delivery of a note) ; Atlas Investment Co. v. Christ, 240 Wis. 114, 2
N.W.2d 714 (1942) (defense denying plaintiff was a holder in due course) ; Munoz &
Co. v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 118 Misc. 24, 193 N.Y. Supp. 422 (Sup. Ct.
1922) ("exhaustive answer" directly contradicting plaintiff's assertions); Kaunitz v.
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defense or claim as lack of authority to execute the document, misrepre-
sentation, or mistake." In such cases, the statements in the affidavits
will be accepted as true,"9 and the resulting conflicts in the evidence will
not be resolved in summary judgment proceedings.6" Thus if the
opponent of the motion does satisfy the burden imposed upon him by
producing controverting evidence, a material issue of fact is raised and
the case will be remitted for trial.
Occasional aberrations from this rule may be found. Thus in
Goldman v. Leeann Builders,6 it was said by way of dictum .that the
cc"*. court may weigh the allegations, visualize the factual picture as
it is fully set forth by all affidavits, judge the inherent probabilities and
the value and weight and convincing nature of the sworn statements, and
decide how real is the defendant's denial of liability."62 It is safe to say
that appellate courts in New York have never accepted such a statement, 3
and that the grant of 'such power would be ruled unconstitutional as
Wheeler, 344 Mich. 181, 73 N.W.2d 263 (1955) (breach of contract by plaintiff and
payment); Goldman v. Leeann Builders, 197 Misc. 228, 94 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1950)
(parol agreement governing payment).
58. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of the United States, 259 N.Y. 365, 182
N.E. 18 (1932) (mistake) ; Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co. v. Ditmars, 203 App.
Div. 748, 197 N.Y. Supp. 405 (1st Dep't 1922) (duress); Barrett v. Shanks, 300 Ill.
App. 119, 20 N.E.2d 799 (1939) (fraud) ; Granite Trust Bldg. Corp. v.. Great Atlantic &
Pac. T. Co., 36 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1940) (lack of authority) ; Sillman v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 144 N.E.2d 387 (1957) (waiver); Gillum v.
Skelly Oil Co., 149 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Mo. 1957) (release). Releases have commonly
been resisted on the ground of fraud or duress. Holzman v. Barrett, 192 F.2d 113 (7th
Cir. 1951) (duress) ; Rizzuto v. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 213 App.
Div. 326, 210 N.Y. Supp. 482 (2d Dep't 1925) (ibid.); Camerlin v. New York Cent.
R.R., 199 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1952) (fraud) ; Willett v. Chase National Bank, 219 App.
Div. 41, 219 N.Y. Supp. 289 (1st Dep't 1926) (fraud and'-want of consideration).
Compare plaintiff's evidence in resisting defendant's motion based on a release in! Uli-
barri v. Christenson, supra note "40 and Nahtel Corp. v. West Virginia Pulp and -Paper
Co., 141 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1944) (summary judgment granted), with Guerrero v. American-
Hawaiian Steamship Co., 222 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1955) (summary judgment denied).
59. Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan & Building Ass'n, 310 Ill. App. 465, 34 N.E.
2d 736 (1941) ; Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1940) ; Dempsey v. Lang-
ton, 266 Mich. 47, 253 N.W. 210 (1934); Union National Bank of Troy v. Corey, .93
N.Y.S.2d 35 (City Ct. 1949). See 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTcE § ,56.15 [4], at 2139-41
(1953).
60. Dwan v. Massarene, szupra note 57; Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 116. P.2d
62 (1941) ; Bullard Gage Co. v. Saffady, 307 Mich. 296, 11 N.W.2d 895 (1943) ;.Birkem
feld v. Ginsburg, 106 N.J.L. 377, 146 Atl. 176 (1929) ; Atlas Investment Co..v. Christ,
supra note 57; Berick v. Curran, 55 R.I. 193, 179 Atl. 708, (1935).
61. 197 Misc. 228, 94 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1950). The court denied summary
judgment, finding a defense raised by the affidavits.
62. Id. at 231, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 859 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
63. Dwan v. Massarene, supra note 57; Bernstein,.v. Kritzer,. 224 App. Div. 387,
231 N.Y. Supp. 97 (1st Dep'.t 1928) ; Berson Sydeman Co;'.v. "Waumbeck:Mfg. Co., 212
App. Div. 422, 208 N.Y. Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1925) :_Compare, however, 'the language
used by the court in Manhattan Paper Co. v. Bayer, 147t;Misc. 227, 263 NY. Supp. 720
.(Sup. Ct. 1931);,
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depriving the parties of a jury trial.64 The accepted rule was clearly and
forcefully stated in Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCarthy,"5 when the
court said: "If the affidavit of defense shows a substantial issue of fact,
a summary judgment should not be ordered even though the affidavit
be disbelieved. If the affidavits on the one side and on the other are
directly opposed as to the facts shown, the case must go to trial."66
The noteworthy factor in the cases just considered is the willingness
of courts to accept the truthfulness of the moving party's proof in support
of the motion. Primarily this results from the acceptability of docu-
mentary proof, but additionally, the authenticating and explanatory affi-
davit evidence concerns a transaction where knowledge is shared by both
parties to the litigation. This accounts for the requirement that the
opponent of the motion produce evidence showing the existence of an
issue of fact. Because of the nature of the transactions being litigated,
denial of information or knowledge is regarded as insufficient.67 Only
in rare cases will the motion be defeated by a claimed lack of knowledge,
as when a note executed by a decedent is asserted against his estate."
When supporting affidavit evidence has a more extensive purpose,
and is used to establish material facts within the exclusive knowledge of
the moving party, a more serious problem faces the courts. While it is
obvious that such situations may arise in commercial litigation, cases
of this type multiplied when the "shackels were stricken off"6 the sum-
64. Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen, 370 Ill. 523, 19 N.E.2d 363 (1939).
Compare Judge Fee's statement in New and Used Auto Sales v. Hansen, 245 F.2d 951,
954 (9th Cir. 1957) ("Here judgment was entered without the benefit of trial. There
is no precedent for the action taken in the instant case. If there were precedent, it
would be disapproved.").
65. 295 Mass. 597, 4 N.E.2d 450, 107 A.L.R. 1215 (1936).
66. Id. at 603. Compare the statements made by English courts in Jacobs v.
Booth's Distillery Co., 85 L.T. 262 (H.L. 1901) ; Blaiberg v. Abrams, 77 L.T. Journal
255 (C.A. 1884).
67. Thus a denial of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about
a transaction in which the opponent of the motion has personal knowledge is insufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Heiter v. Heiter, 2 Misc. 2d 904, 157
N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Second National Bank v. Breitung, 203 App. Div. 636,
197 N.Y. Supp. 375 (1st Dep't 1922).
68. Woodmere Academy v. Moskowitz, 212 App. Div. 457, 208 N.Y. Supp. 578 (2d
Dep't 1925). It has been held that lack of knowledge under these circumstances does
not prevent a summary judgment unless a genuine effort has been made to ascertain the
validity of the claim. Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCarthy, szpra note 65. Obviously
distinguishable are cases in which the plaintiff-movant proves his claims by a document,
such as an insurance policy, and evidence within his exclusive possession. This problem
is considered subsequently, see note 111 infra, but consult in addition, Dolge v. Com-
mercial Casualty Ins. Co., 211 App. Div. 112, 207 N.Y. Supp. 42 (2d Dep't 1924), aff'd,
240 N.Y. 656, 148 N.E. 746 (1925).
69. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MImN. L. REv. 567, 569 (1952). Moore
states that there is no "theoretical or sound practical reason" for excluding summary
judgment from any civil action. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.17, p. 2171 (1953).
This is an oversimplification, since as has been shown, the extension of the procedure
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mary judgment procedure by the adoption of Federal Rule 56. In the
new categories of cases to which the procedure was made applicable, the
supporting testimonial proof differs from testimony in commercial cases
considered previously because it is casual and did not result from planned
transactions where there was mutual participation by the parties. Events
giving rise to tort claims, for example, are fortuitous, and thus the
opponent of the motion may have little or no knowledge of the event giv-
ing rise to the litigation. Even when he has knowledge, it is certainly not
the shared knowledge of a typical commercial undertaking. In negligence
cases particularly, knowledge of the accident is at best haphazard and
incomplete.
The reluctance of courts to accept testimonial proof in these cases
is intensified by judicial distrust and suspicion of evidence presented in
the form of affidavits or depositions. Affidavits have long been
regarded as the poorest type of evidence, particularly in cases where the
testimony is that of an interested witness, because the affiant is im-
munized from the test of cross-examination." If the evidence is presented
in the form of a deposition, this difficulty is partially overcome since an
opportunity for cross-examination of the witness may be provided.
Nevertheless, the right to cross-examination under these circumstances
may be less valuable either because the deposition is taken by written
interrogatories or because the examination is conducted before the
opponent is fully aware of all aspects of the case.7" Moreover, demeanor
evidence is missing in all of these cases. The value of demeanor evidence
may be minimized in cases where the proof supporting the motion consists
of documents, but in determining the credibility of witnesses such evi-
dence assumes a significance that makes courts reluctant to proceed with-
out it.
Thus the nature of the transactions which gave rise to the litigation
and the type of proof presented in support of the motion led courts to
limit or abandon the postulate upon which rested the decisions under
presents problems of proof that never occurred when the remedy was restricted to bills
and notes. On the other hand, restricting the procedure to stated classes of cases
raises its own problems of classification. See Weinstein and Korn, Preliminary Mo-
tions in New York: A Critique, 57 CoLuam. L. REV. 526, 527 n.7 (1957).
70. See 2 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, Book 3, c. 13, § 3, p. 276,
278 (1827) where he evaluates affidavits at ". . . the very lowest point of the scale
of trust-worthiness." See also 2 MOORE, TREATISE ON FACTS OR THE WEIGHT AND
VALUE OF EVIDENCE § 938-43, at 1094 et seq. (affidavit evidence) and § 1092, at 1225
(interested witnesses) (1908). Compare the comments in Lacy v. United States, 207
F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1953) and Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d 661 (9th
Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
71. 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 70, §§ 963-67, at 1114. Cf. Bentham's comments on
the older deposition practice in An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, c. 11,
§§ 2-3, at 36 in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (Bowring ed. 1843).
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Keating's Act. In its place, two discernible patterns of decisions de-
veloped. One group applies rules of construction to the supporting proof
to determine its sufficiency to establish the material facts in controversy.
Credibility is not directly questioned, and assuming the evidence to be
true, the court questions its legal adequacy to establish the claim or
defense."2 The other pattern of decisions makes no such concession, but
challenges not only the legal sufficiency of the evidence, but its credibility
as well. This is generally accomplished by imposing upon the party
moving for judgment the burden of establishing the facts of the con-
troversy with some stated degree of probability." There is no rigid
adherence to either approach in a given jurisdiction, but the former
method is employed chiefly in states where the summary judgment
procedure is limited to certain categories of cases.
Courts utilizing the construction technique examine the supporting
proof to determine if the evidence presented complies with the governing
rules or statutes. In making this determination, the rule of construction
applied is that the affidavits of the moving party are to be strictly con-
strued, whereas the affidavits of the opponent are given a liberal construc-
tion to avoid an unjust deprivation of a full trial.74 Thus to succeed on a
motion for a summary judgment, a moving party must produce evidence
sufficient to withstand a meticulous examination, and at the same time,
convince the court that the opponent's proof, liberally construed, raises
no material issue of fact. Evidentiary facts in the opponent's affidavits
or depositions are accepted as true, of course, and if a material issue of
fact is raised, the motion for judgment must be denied."3
As already indicated, courts experienced no difficulty in accepting
affidavits detailing documentary evidence probative of the material facts
of a claim or defense."6 Thus the purpose of the construction technique
was to meet the need for a standard testing the adequacy of evidence other
than documents. In employing this method, affidavits are scrutinized to
determine if they contain evidentiary facts rather than opinions, con-
clusions, hearsay, or other objectionable matter. Little difficulty is
encountered in condemning as conclusory affidavits merely repeating
72. See text at notes 74-86 in-fra.
73. See text at notes 89-99 infra.
74. Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264 (1942);
Weichman v. Vetri, 100 Cal. App. 2d 177, 223 P.2d 288 (1950) ; Wyatt v. Madden, 59
App. D.C. 38, 32 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1929) ; Berick v. Curran, 55 R.I. 193, 179 Atl.
708 (1935); Minuto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 55 R.I. 201, 179 Atl. 713 (1935);
Soelke v. Chicago Business Men's Racing Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 336, 41 N.E.2d 232
(1942). But see, Fisher v. Hargrave, 318 Ill. App. 510, 518, 48 N.E.2d 966 (1943).
75. See cases cited note 59 supra, and Barkhausen v. Naugher, 395 Ill. 562, 70
-N.E.2d 565 (1946) ; Berick v. Curran, szpra note 74.
76. See cases cited notes 34-44 supra.
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statutory language that a claim "is founded on a contract express or
implied."77  As the specificity of affidavits increases, however, the
more exacting becomes the task of determining whether they have the
desired evidentiary quality. Thus in Gardenswartz v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society,7 recovery on an insurance policy depended upon proof
of total disability. Summary judgment was denied to the plaintiff be-
cause the affidavit of his physician, stating the type of disease suffered by
the plaintiff and that he was "disabled and unable to engage in any
occupation . . . of financial value" was labeled mere opinion beyond
the scope of testimony proper for a medical expert."
As greater reliance is placed upon testimonial evidence of doubtful
credibility, the readiness of the court to find such evidence inadequate
correspondingly increases. This is accomplished by ruling that the
statements in the affidavits are opinions, conclusions, or generalizations
rather than evidentiary facts.8" Supporting proof under these circum-
stances will be found inadequate although the opponent, as in the Garden-
swartz case, fails to produce controverting proof. On the other hand,
once the proof survives the court's scrutiny, it is accepted as establishing
the facts, and the burden of producing evidence to show the necessity
of a trial shifts to the opponent."
In satisfying the burden thus imposed, the opponent of the motion
theoretically is entitled to the benefit of the liberal construction rule, but
in reality the ultimate decision turns upon the nature of the moving party's
proof. Thus if the proof in support of the motion is largely documentary
and has a high degree of credibility the opponent must produce con-
vincing proof attacking the documents in order to sustain his burden. 2
77. Berick v. Curran, supra note 74. See also Minuto v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co., supra note 74.
78. 23 Cal. App. 2d 745, 68 P.2d 322 (1937). See also Low v. Woodward Oil Co.,
133 Cal. App. 2d 116, 283 P.2d 720 (1955).
79. Gardenswartz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., supra note 78, at 753.
80. Compare Gardenswartz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., supra note 78; Coyne
v. Krempels, 218 P.2d 125 (Cal. App. 1950) ; Weichman v. Vetri, supra note 74; Cas-
well v. Stearns, 257 Mich. 461, 241 N.W. 165 (1932), with the following decisions by the
same courts in cases where the moving party relied on documentary evidence: Cone v.
Union Oil Co. of California, 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 277 P.2d 464 (1954); Gambord
Meat Co. v. Corbari, 109 Cal. App. 2d 161, 240 P.2d 342 (1952) (account stated) ; Shea
v. Leonis, 29 Cal. App. 2d 184, 84 P.2d 277 (1938); Killian v. Welfare Engineering
Co., 328 Ill. App. 375, 66 N.E.2d 305 (1946) ; Walker v. Woods, 334 Ill. App. 619, 79
N.E.2d 533 (1948); Rosenthal v. Halsband, 51 R.I. 119, 152 At]. 320 (1930); People's
Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich. 273, 230 N.W. 170 (1930);
Smith v. Karasek, 313 Ill. App. 654, 40 N.E.2d 594 (1942).
81. See Coyne v. Krempels, 36 Cal. 2d 257, 223 P.2d 244 (1950) ; Cone v. Union
Oil Co. of California, supra note 80; Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan & Bldg. Ass'n,
310 Ill. App. 465, 34 N.E.2d 736 (1941).




In spite of the rule of liberal interpretation, controverting affidavits may
be found inadequate by the simple expedient of labeling the statements
conclusions or generalizations rather than evidence.8 3 If the moving
party's proof is less convincing, as in cases where he relies on his own
testimony or has exclusive knowledge of the transaction, the burden of
providing evidence may never shift to the opponent.8 4 If the opponent
nevertheless produces controverting affidavits, as frequently happens in
these cases, the liberal construction rule applies, and one reads that the
averments in such affidavits need not " be rigidly restricted to
evidentiary matter." 5
The operation of this technique is strikingly illuminated by the
opinions of the California District Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in Coyne v. Krempels.86 In that case, the plaintiff sought to
recover $4,000 pursuant to an agreement entered into with the defendant
whereby plaintiff was to sell the defendant's bus, keeping the excess above
$4,500 as the agreed commission. Plaintiff asserted in his affidavit that
he had procured four buyers who were willing to purchase the bus for
$8,500, subject only to testing the bus, but that the defendant breached
the contract by refusing to permit the examination. The defendant,
relying solely on his verified answer, denied that plaintiff had buyers
who were ready, willing, and able to perform, and, in addition, alleged
affirmatively that the plaintiff himself had been guilty of a breach of
the contract. The District Court of Appeals reversed a summary judg-
ment for the plaintiff for two reasons: first, the affidavits filed by the
plaintiff failed to substantiate his cause of action in that they omitted
stating the names of the purchasers and proper notification of defendant;
and second, the defendant's verified answer was sufficient to raise an
issue for trial.
83. Cowan Oil & Refining Co. v. Miley Petroleum Corp., 112 Cal. App. 773, 295
Pac. 504 (1931) ; Shea v. Leonis, suapra note 80; Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan &
Bldg. Ass'n, supra note 81; Rosenthal v. Halsband, supra note 80; Henry W. Cooke Co.
v. Sheldon, 53 R.I. 101, 164 Atl. 327 (1933) ; People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine
Box Co., supra note 80.
84. A good example is Gardenswartz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., supra note
78.
85. Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264 (1942).
See also McComsey v. Leaf, 36 Cal. App. 2d 132, 97 P.2d 242 (1939) ; Baxter v. Szucs,
248 Mich. 672, 227 N.W. 666 (1929) ; Soelke v. Chicago Business Men's Racing Ass'n,
314 I1. App. 336, 41 N.E.2d 232 (1942) ; Caswell v. Stearns, 257 Mich. 461, 241 N.W.
165 (1932). Compare the court's statement in finding the opponent's affidavits suf-
ficient in Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Mutual Trucking Co., 337 Ill. App. 140, 85
N.E.2d 349 (1949) ("After a painstaking examination of the evidence we have reached
the conclusion that Mutual introduced some evidence that tended to prove that Milliken
had actual or apparent authority ... ").
86. 218 P.2d 125 (1950), rev'd, 36 Cal. 2d 257, 223 P.2d 244 (1950).
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On appeal, the summary judgment was reinstated by Supreme
Court. That court found that the plaintiff's affidavits were sufficient
to show the breach of contract by the defendant's refusal to permit
demonstrations of the bus. The defendant's contention that the verified
answer raised issues for trial precluding a summary disposition was
unequivocally rejected by the Supreme Court on the ground that it would
nullify the entire summary judgment procedure.
The case demonstrates the crucial effect of the decision as to the
adequacy of the moving party's proof. As was mentioned, proof in sup-
port of the motion in the Coyne case consisted of affidavits setting out'
the written agreement and averring that the plaintiff had procured several
buyers who agreed to purchase the bus, subject to its examination and
demonstration."7 The District Court of Appeals regarded this evidence
as insufficient to support the motion for reasons stated previously and
thus never faced the problem of determining the adequacy of the de-
fendant's proof. The Supreme Court, however, decided that the support-
ing proof was adequate and hence the burden of coming forward with
evidence was shifted to the defendant. Thus, given a favorable decision
as to adequacy of the plaintiff's proof, controverting proof had to be
produced to prevent judgment. Since the defendant relied solely on his
verified answer, he failed to sustain his burden of proof even under
the liberal construction rule and consequently suffered an adverse judg-
ment.
In failing to discuss why the plaintiff's supporting proof had the de-
sired persuasiveness, the Supreme Court decision in the Coyne case is
representative of opinions in this area. Common factors found in cases
where the supporting proof is deemed adequate are documentary evidence
and transactions with knowledge mutually shared by the parties."8 Since
the decisional device of affidavit scrutiny is resorted to chiefly in states
where summary judgment is restricted to contract-type relationships, the
typical case involves a transaction in which there has been mutual par-
ticipation by the parties. In such cases, it seems reasonable to accept the
proof of the moving party when the opponent who shares knowledge of
the event does not bother to produce controverting evidence. Once the
element of shared knowledge is removed, as in the Gardenswartg case
on the issue of total disability, the courts tend to find the proof inadequate
87. Id. at 218 P.2d 125, 127.
88. The factor of shared knowledge is present in the cases cited supra notes 35-43.
See also Dodwell & Co. v. Silverman, 234 App. Div. 362, 254 N.Y. Supp. 746 (1st Dep't
1932), and cases where the statute of limitations is relied on as a defense and is not
provable by documents. Carroll v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 100 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Pa.
1951) ; Deer v. New York Cent. R.R., 202 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Corash v. Texas
Co., 264 App. Div. 292, 35 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1st Dep't 1942).
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even though no controverting proof is presented. If proof is produced
by the opponent in such cases, it is given a liberal interpretation because
of a distrust of the evidence relied on by the movant. Thus though the
decisions are rationalized in terms of the adequacy of the affidavits, the
determination of that question appears to rest ultimately upon the court's
decision as to the credibility of the supporting proof. Since factors
entering into this determination are seldom explicitly discussed in these
opinions, the real basis of decision often remains obscure. Evaluation
of these factors is therefore postponed and will be made in the discussion
of the other method of decision which avowedly does concern itself with
questiong of credibility.
The significant feature of the other decisional pattern is its complete
rejection of the postulate underlying Keating's Act. Because the evi-
dentiary basis of cases not provable by documentary evidence is regarded
with suspicion, great care is exercised to avoid the danger of denying
a full trial to a worthy litigant. Thus the party rhoving for summary
judgment is required to show not only that the supporting proof provides
an adequate evidentiary basis for the motion, as in the previous cases, but
also that such proof has the requisite degree of credibility. The imposi-
tion of this burden rests squarely on the court's doubt as to the reliability
of the movant's own proof irrespective of the production of controverting
proof by the opponent. The court in Griffith, v- William Penn Broad-
casting Co. 9 stated: "Defendant's failure to file a counter-affidavit to
support its opposition to the motions is of no significance. . . . The
burden rests upon plaintiff, the moving party, to establish the non-
existence of a genuine issue of fact. . . . In the absence of a showing
in the pleadings and depositions that, in the event the case should go to
trial, there would be no competent evidence to support findings of fact
in defendant's favor, plaintiff has not met his burden."
In accord with this case, Professor Moore states flatly that the
moving party has the burden of "showing the absence of any genuine
issue as to all the material facts. . . . "" Since as a practical matter it
is impossible for the moving party to prove the non-existence of an
issue of fact, the imposition of such a burden serves to warn litigants
that summary judgments are to be entered only in cases where the
movant's assertions as to the factual basis of the dispute have a high
degree of probability.
89. 4 F.R.D. 475, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1945). See also Albert Dickinson Co. v. Mellos
Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1950).
90. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.15[3], at 2123 (1953). The full implications
of this statement are severely qualified by the discussion which follows, indicating ways
in which a moving party can satisfy the burden of removing genuine issues of fact.
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An even more cautious approach to summary judgment is found in
Judge Jerome Frank's celebrated opinion in Doehler Metal Furniture Co.
v. United States."' In this case the United States sought to recover dam-
ages for breach of a contract which provided that if the defendant failed
to make agreed deliveries of furniture, the United States might terminate
the contract and purchase similar materials in the open market, charging
any cost in excess of the original contract price to the defendant. Pur-
suant to these provisions, the United States purchased furniture from
another manufacturer and sought to recover from the defendant the
excess amount paid. The new contract differed from the original in
providing for liquidated damages in case of any delay in the delivery
of the furniture. A summary judgment for the United States was
reversed because of the failure to show that the liquidated damage clause
in the second contract had not raised the price of the furniture and thus
enhanced damages. Although no evidence was presented to the court
showing that the clause had resulted in a higher price, Judge, Frank, in
placing on the moving party the burden of establishing all facts necessary
for relief, made this oft-quoted observation: "A litigant has a right to a
trial where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts ... . "92
The Doehler case thus placed on the moving party the burden of con-
vincing the court that there is not the "slightest doubt" as to the factual
basis of the dispute, and since the United States had failed to establish
that the liquidated damages clause did not affect the price of the furni-
ture, this burden had not been met. Logically, of course, there will always
be a "slight doubt" as to the facts, since judicial proof is a matter of
probabilities."3 The best that the movant can do in a contested lawsuit
is to establish disputed propositions as highly probable. Thus the pro-
posed standard of Judge Frank means that the evidentiary basis of the
motion must have a high degree of probability. Since an estimate. of
probabilities can not be made with mathematical exactitude, the practical
application of the standard requires the court to deny summary judgment
in all but the most convincing cases.
The "slightest doubt" test of Judge Frank and the imposition of an
additional burden on the movant in Professor Moore's formulation illu-
strate the repudiation by courts and commentators of a rule which
requires the movant's evidence to be accepted solely because it is not
91. 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945).
92. Id. at 135.
93. See CASTELL, A COLLEGE LOGIC 334 (1935); COHEN AND NAGLE, LOGIC AND
SCIENTIFIC METHOD, C. VIII (1934); CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY
176-77 (1950). Cf. Judge Frank's statements on this subject in COURTS ON TRIAL, C. III
(1949) and LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, c. XII, at 116 (1930).
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controverted by an opposing party. The issue of the credibility of the
supporting proof presented at the hearing may itself be a sufficient
reason for denying summary relief, simply because courts are unwilling
to resolve such issues in the absence of cross-examination and demeanor
evidence. 4
This same result is frequently reached by the application of directed
verdict standards to the evidence produced by the moving party in support
of his motion for summary judgment. 5 As previously stated, the typical
standard used in disposing of motions for directed verdicts precludes
the court from resolving as a matter of law issues of credibility raised
by testimonial evidence. 6 It follows that the application of such a
standard to summary judgment proceedings supported by testimonial
evidence prevents a favorable disposition of the motion since a court
which refuses to rule as a matter of law even when the benefits of
demeanor evidence and cross-examination are present will scarcely decide
that such a disposition can be made when they are missing. 7
A widely copied, but less specific standard was stated by the New
York Court of Appeals in Curry v. Mackenzie. To grant a motion for
summary judgment, ". . . the court must be convinced that the issue is
not genuine, but feigned, and that there is in truth nothing to be tried."99
Obviously a standard phrased in such general language offers little to
guide a court in determining when an issue of fact is genuine in a par-
ticular case. Yet its very generality permits a ruling that the supporting
proof is insufficient to sustain the burden imposed on the moving party
of convincing the court that the issues are feigned, as cases discussed
subsequently will show.
Judge Frank's skepticism of the factual basis of the moving party's
motion and his belief in the importance of demeanor evidence in judging
the credibility of testimonial evidence has led him to find a "slight doubt"
in almost all cases where proof supporting the motion is other than an
unimpeached document. This position was stated most emphatically in
Colby v. Klune, °° where Judge Frank found the supporting affidavits
94. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Moxley v. Atlantic Refining Co.,
99 F. Supp. 499 (W.D. La. 1951).
95. Gifford v. Travelers Protective Ass'n of America, 153 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.
1946); Edward F. Dibble Seedgrower v. Jones, 130 Misc. 359, 223 N.Y. Supp. 785
(Sup. Ct. 1927) ; Meserole Securities Co. v. Dintenfass, 108 N.J.L. 298, 156 Ati. 465
(1931).
96. See notes 26-28 supra.
97. Fireman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1945);
Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R. Co., 135 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1943).
98. 239 N.Y. 267, 146 N.E. 375 (1925).
99. Id. at 269-70
100. 1.78 F.2d 872, 873-74 (2d Cir. 1949).
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inadequate "... because their acceptance as proof depends on credi-
bility; and-absent an unequivocal waiver of a trial on oral testimony-
credibility ought not, when witnesses are available, be determined by
mere paper affirmations or denials that inherently lack the important
element of witness' demeanor." Thus Judge Frank, with a few exceptions
noted subsequently, will resolve credibility issues in favor of the movant
only when proof is in the form of unimpeached documents.''
Many courts do not formulate the rule so categorically, but find
factors in the case which raise questions as to the credibility of the
testimonial proof adduced in support of the motion. The presence of
these factors, in conjunction with the testimonial nature of the proof,
results in a ruling that the moving party has failed to sustain his burden
of proving the non-existence of an issue of fact, the absence of a genuine
issue of fact, or whatever other of the above standards the court chooses
to apply.
One such factor, of an ancient if not honorable lineage, is that the
proffered testimony is by an interested affiant. °2 In such cases, courts
require the witness to testify in open court where his demeanor can be
observed.' As the United States Supreme Court observed in Sartor
v. Arkansas Gas Corp.,' interested witnesses should not be withdrawn
from cross-examination, ". .. the best method yet devised for testing
trustworthiness of testimony."
An interesting case illustrating this tendency is Karpas v. Bandler "'
The plaintiff moved for a summary judgment in an action brought to
recover on a promissory note. The defense interposed was that the note
was delivered conditionally to one Goldberg and that plaintiff, a sub-
sequent holder, had knowledge of this fact. Under these circumstances,
New York law placed on the plaintiff the burden of proving that he was a
holder in due course. In moving for summary judgment, plaintiff sub-
mitted affidavits denying any knowledge of the conditional delivery.
Defendant's affidavits showed the original agreement between himself
and Goldberg and that the plaintiff was a partner of Goldberg in a
number of business transactions. Goldberg, in his affidavit, admitted
101. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1946). See notes 138-39 infra.
102. See 1 MoORE, TREATISE ON FACTS OR THE WEIGHT AND VALUE OF EVIDENCE
§§ 78-91, at 122-36 (1908); 5 JONES, EVIDENCE § 2127, at 3997; 6 id. § 2438, at 4825
(2d ed. 1926) ; 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 576 (1940). -
103. Weiss v. Goldberger, 209 App. Div. 615, 205 N.Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't 1924);
Moir v. Johnson, 211 App. Div. 427, 207 N.Y. Supp. 380 (4th Dep't 1925) ; Burt v.
Bilofsky, 9 F.R.D. 299 (D.N.J. 1949); Farber v. DeBruin, 253 App. Div. 909, 2 N.Y.S.
2d 244 (2d Dep't 1938).
104. 321 U.S. 620 (1944). Compare the dissenting opinion of Stone, C.J., at 631.
105. 218 App. Div. 418, 218 N.Y. Supp. 500 (1st Dep't 1926).
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that an agreement had been made not to discount the note at a bank.
In reversing summary judgment the court said: "In the case at bar the
plaintiff being an interested witness, a jury would not be bound to
accept his testimony that he did not have knowledge of a conditional
delivery of the note if there was in fact such a conditional delivery."106
In the light of all of the evidence, the jury, ". . . might reject the
plaintiff's testimony of lack of knowledge even though such testimony
were not directly contradicted."1 7
The case is particularly interesting because of the contrast it pro-
vides with the ordinary case involving a promissory note. It has been
shown that the New York courts accept the authenticity of documents
and require the defendant to produce controverting evidence to raise
an issue of credibility when an action is brought on a promissory note.
But when the plaintiff must establish his case by the note and evidence
within his exclusive knowledge, the court is willing to find an issue of
credibility even in the absence of controverting evidence on the disputed
issue. It seems difficult to quarrel with courts making this distinction,
for there appears to be no reason for giving to a party moving for sum-
mary judgment an advantage he would not enjoy at a trial, and it is
certainly true that at a trial the credibility of the testimony of an interested
witness is not ordinarily resolved as a matter of law.
Closely related to the question of interest is the factor of movant's
exclusive knowledge of the events and occurrences giving rise to liti-
gation. Ve have seen that in cases where the evidence of the moving
party relates to a mutual business transaction, courts are more willing
to resolve the issues of credibility in favor of the movant in the absence
of controverting evidence." 8 Contrariwise, courts are reluctant to fore-
close a party summarily and deprive him of the opportunity of testing the
credibility of witnesses in open court where knowledge is exclusively
in possession of the movant."'
A typical application of this principle is made in cases where the
court denies a summary judgment because of the failure of the moving
party to make a full and fair disclosure of facts within his exclusive
106. Id. at 421.
107. Ibid.
108. See notes 83, 87 supra.
109. See Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3d
Cir. 1942) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Podhorzer, 221 App. Div. 644, 645, 224 N.Y.
Supp. 505, 506 (1st Dep't 1927); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1949)
("Particularly where, as here, the facts are peculiarly in the knowledge of the defend-
ants or their witnesses, should the plaintiff have the opportunity to impeach them at a
trial .. ") ; Suslensky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 180 Misc. 624, 43 N.Y.S.2d 144
(Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 812, 46 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1st Dep't 1944).
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knowledge."' Thus in Brooklyn Clothing Corp" v. Fidelity Plwnix Fire
Insurance Co.,"" defendant's liability depended upon an oral agreement
made between the plaintiff and one Fox. In moving for a summary
judgment, plaintiff failed to make a full disclosure of the terms of this
agreement, and defendant, who was without knowledge as to the arrange-
ment made, simply denied the agreement on information and belief. A
summary judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, the court ruling that
the plaintiff should not be permitted to remove the witnesses from the
test of cross-examination on the basis of such an unsatisfactory showing.
The significant aspect of this case is found in the court's conclusion
that the moving papers were insufficient although the defendant's re-
buttal consisted of little more than a plea of ignorance. The court was
not required to resolve the problem of the defendant's duty to utilize
available discovery devices since the testimonial proof of the plaintiff
was itself insufficient.
Quite a different problem is presented when the moving party makes
a full disclosure of all the evidence available to him. While a motion for
summary judgment will not be denied simply because the opposing party
claims ignorance," 2 .the inability of the opponent to produce evidence
because knowledge of the transaction is within the exclusive possession
of the movant is a factor which may, either by itself or when weighed
with all the other peculiar circumstances of the case, preclude a summary
judgment." 3 Unlike the cases considered earlier, it is impossible for
courts to -indulge in a presumption of truth because of the opponent's
failure to disclose controverting evidence, since these cases pre-suppose
that the opponent cannot produce evidence in spite of diligent efforts.
Under such circumstances, the issues of credibility raised by the movant's
110. Berger v. Rospond, 108 N.J.L. 268, 158 Atl. 472 (1932) (the affidavits pre-
sented by the movant appeared to suppress important facts) ; Templeton v. Borough of
Glen Rock, 11 N.J. Super. 1, 77 A.2d 487 (1950) (failure to disclose material fact with-
in its knowledge).
111. 205 App. Div. 743, 200 N.Y. Supp. 208 (2d Dep't 1923).
112. Hartman v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671, 677 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rev'd in part,
166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948) ; Lata v. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Electric Service Supplies
Co. v. Consolidated Indemnity & Ins. Co., 111 N.J.L. 288, 168 Atl. 412 (1933) ; Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Oil Wells Supply Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d
265, 269, 55 P.2d 885, 887 (1936) ; Bishop v. Shaughnessy, 119 F. Supp. 62 (N.D.N.Y.
1950). - ."
113. .United States.v. Gotham Pharmacal Corp., 1 F.R.D. 744, 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) ; Cagwllv. Stearns, 257 Mich. 461, 241 N.W. 165 (1932) ; Friedman v. Friedman,
251 App. Div. 835, 296 N.Y. Supp. 714 (2d Dep't 1937); Joseph Home Co. v. United
States, 135 F. Supp. 549 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ; Christensen v. Hillman Periodicals, 107 F. Supp.
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Public Adm'r of New York County v. Brownell, 115 F. Supp.
139. (S.D.N.Y. 1953). . .'
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own proof will be resolved only after a trial where demeanor can be
observed and the proof tested by cross-examination, not as a matter of
law on a motion for summary judgment."'
Exclusive knowledge on the part of the moving party is frequently
found in cases where the contested issue is one involving some mental
state such as fraud, good faith, intent, or probable cause in a malicious
prosecution action.'1 5 Courts have been unwilling to have such issues
resolved on the basis of paper affirmations, and have ruled that the
movant must submit himself to cross-examination in open court regard-
less of whether or not the opposing party has produced controverting
evidence." 6 In Peckham v. Ronrico Corp.,"7 plaintiff argued that the
summary judgment procedure is never proper ". . . where fraud is
alleged and the critical facts are in the possession of the moving party."
In Hatfield v. Barnes,"' the court stated: "Particularly on such issues
as good faith, intent, and purpose, the bald declaration of a party by
affidavit is not sufficient to resolve the issue in the face of a pleaded
denial."
In these cases there is a justifiable judicial fear of the injustice which
could result from judgment based on affidavits asserting facts that are,
because of their nature, incapable of being effectively controverted." 9
Because the courts are unwilling to accept as true the assertions in the
supporting papers of the moving party, summary judgments are denied
114. Cf. text at notes 30, 84, and 88 supra.
115. See, for example, Hummel v. Riordon, 56 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ill. 1944)
(fraud) ; Callahan-Kelly Post Memorial Ass'n v. City of New York, 124 N.Y.S.2d 261
(Sup. Ct. 1953) (purpose) ; Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 224
F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1955) (wantonness); Martin v. Greyhound Corp., 227 F.2d 501 (6th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1013 (1955) (ibid.) ; Loew's, Inc. v. Bays, 209 F.2d
610 (5th Cir. 1954) (good faith); Libby v. L.J. Corp., 247 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(ibid.); Hazelrigg v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 228 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1955)
(ibid.) ; Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 154 F. Supp. 108, 118 (N.D. Ill. 1957) (mo-
tive) ; United States v. Gardner, 244 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1957) (wilfulness) ; Bishop v.
Shaughnessy, 119 F. Supp. 62 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (intention) ; Cochran v. United States,
123 F. Supp. 362 (D. Conn. 1954) (ibid.) ; C. S. Hammond & Co. v. International Col-
lege Globe, 146 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (copying). Compare cases involving
violations of price regulations such as Forde v United States, 189 F.2d 727 (1st Cir.
1951) ; Fancher v. Clark, 127 F. Supp. 452 (D. Colo. 1954) ; and Bagby v. United States,
199 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1952), with the same type of case when plaintiff seeks to recover
treble damages based on wilfulness. Hart v. Leihy, 122 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Mo.
1954) ; Bryne v. United States, 218 F.2d 327 (1st Cir. 1955).
116. California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, 162 F.2d 893, 174 A.L.R.
481 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947) ; Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope
Co., 155 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Petrie v. Roberts, 242 Wis. 539, 8 N.W.2d 355
(1943), noted in Young, Work of the Supreme Court, 1944 iVs. L. REv. 141, 160-62.
117. 171 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1948).
118. 115 Colo. 30, 168 P.2d 552 (1946). But cf. Baum v. Martin, 335 Ill. App.
277, 81 N.E.2d 757 (1948).
119. See authorities collected in 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 102, § 100, at 149.
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irrespective of the existence or persuasiveness of controverting proof.
Since a court would ordinarily wish to have the advantage of demeanor
evidence in judging credibility in these cases, and rarely, if ever, would
rule for the proponent on such an issue as a matter of law at a trial, the
reluctance to grant summary judgments in these cases is easily understood.
Doubt as to the credibility of testimonial proof may be compounded
when the proof is voluminous and the factual basis of the dispute com-
plicated. There are indications that in such cases, the courts are disposed
to deny the motion and postpone decision until a verdict or findings can
be made after a trial.' Similarly, such a doubt may lead to a denial of
the motion when the court finds that the calendar permits a prompt trial
of the dispute.' 2 '
Thus there are a number of factors affecting the credibility of sup-
porting proof that may influence a court to deny a summary judgment
even in the absence of controverting evidence. A fortiori, when the
opponent does produce controverting proof raising factual questions,
the resulting issues of credibility must be resolved at a trial.'22 Typically,
120. Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956);
Mosbacher v. Basler Lebens Versicherungs Gesellschaft, 111 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (complex question of foreign law); Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 111
F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (ibid.); Shultz v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.,
1 F.R.D. 451 (W.D.N.Y. 1940) (500 printed pages of testimony); Knapp v. Kinsey,
249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 157 F. Supp. 877
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("The facts are complex and involved and require consideration of
myriad details.") ; Zig Zag Spring Co. v. Comfort Spring Corp., 89 F. Supp. 410 (D.N.J.
1950) (voluminous record) ; Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946)
("complicated state of facts") ; Ward v. Sampson, 391 Ill. 585, 63 N.E.2d 751 (1945)
(summary judgment restricted to cases "simple in their nature") ; see Kennedy v. Silas
Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 257 (1948) ; Pacific American Fisheries v. Mulloney, 191 F.2d
137, 141 (9th Cir. 1951). A comment in 48 COLUm. L. REv. 780, 784 (1948) stated,
"One study produced some slight evidence that summary judgment was most likely to
be granted where the amount in controversy was small." The study referred to is
Cohen, Summary Judgment in New York, 32 COLUm. L. REv. 825 (1932). A mere
claim that the case is complicated is manifestly insufficient to defeat a summary judg-
nient. See Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, supra note 81, at 469;
McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Utilities, 104 F. Supp. 46 (D. Minn. 1952), aff'd, 204
F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825 (1953) ; Hemler v. Union Producing
Co., 40 F. Supp. 824, 834 (W.D. La. 1941),.rev'd, 134 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1943). Com-
pare the related problem of an indefinite factual background which also prevents a sum-
mary disposition. United States v. Beard, 144 F. Supp. 732 (N.D.N.Y. 1956).
121. Rockefeller Center Luncheon Club v. Johnson, 116 F. Supp. 437 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) ; United States v. Gotham Pharmacal Corp., 1 F.R.D. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ; Raitt
v. Seltzer, 10 F.R.D. 48 (N.D.N.Y. 1950); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v.
Borough of Milltown, 93 F. Supp. 287 (D.N.J. 1950).
122. Krausman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 582, 260 N.Y.
Supp. 319 (1st Dep't 1932); Miorin v. Miorin, 257 App. Div. 556, 13 N.Y.S.2d 705
(3d Dep't 1939); Croker v. Croker, 252 N.Y. 24, 345, 168 N.E. 450, 169 N.E. 408
(1929); McComb v. Aibel, 100 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Steinberg v. Adams, 90
F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Christensen v. Hillman Periodicals, 107 F. Supp. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). It is well settled that issues of fact cannot be resolved merely be-
cause both parties move for summary judgment. The leading case is Begnaud v.
White, 170 F.2d 323 (6th Cir. 1948).
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evidence of this sort is presented, but as indicated, supporting proof is not
accepted solely because such controverting proof is missing,"' and not-
withstanding statements to this effect, no court has consistently applied
any such categorical rule.12 When credibility issues are raised by the
supporting proof itself, there seems to be no particular reason in the
policy of the summary judgment procedure to exact a full disclosure of
evidence from the party opposing the motion.'25 Such evidence is not
needed, and even if produced has no effect on the ultimate disposition
of the motion, which will be denied solely because of the inadequacy of
the supporting proof.
Once the significance of this is grasped, the seeming conflict in the
opinions over the requirement that the opponent of the motion disclose
evidence at the hearing becomes understandable. If proof substantiating
a claim or defense is accepted as true, all courts require the party opposing
the motion to produce evidence or suffer an adverse judgment. But
some judges, notably Judge Frank, are unwilling to accept any
proof short of unimpeached documents. Since in his view other proof
is rarely adequate to support a judgment as a matter of law, there is no
reason to make the motion for summary judgment ". . . a sort of rack
or thumb-screw to bring about disclosure of evidence."' 26 On the other
hand, if the proof in support of the motion forms, as in the case of
unimpeached documents, an adequate basis for a judgment as a matter
of law, then the party opposing the motion is required to produce evidence
to preclude judgment.'27 Other judges, notably Judge Charles E. Clark,
do not adopt any such inflexible rule as to testimonial evidence, but con-
sider the supporting proof in the light of the various factors previously
discussed. Once this proof survives such an examination, it is accepted
123. See in particular cases cited note 89 supra. Cases such as Gif ford v. Travelers
Protective Ass'n, 153 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Port of Palm Beach District v. Goethals,
104 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1939) ; and Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.
1939) are explainable on the basis of the nature of the supporting proof. See text and
cases notes 131 and 136 infra. Orvis v. Brickman, 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952);
Surkin v. Charteris, 197 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1952), and Zampos v. United Smelting, Re-
fining and Mining Co., 206 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1953) raise special problems discussed
infra, notes 212, 229, 245. Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715
(2d Cir. 1943) does support such a rule, but it is not typical. Furthermore, the ruling
was limited to cases in which the opponent had actually cross-examined the supporting
witnesses.
124. Compare the statements in 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.15[3], at 2132;
§ 56.15[5], at 2153 (1953).
125. There may be a policy of exacting a disclosure as a method of correcting a
deficient pre-trial discovery procedure. See GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 208, at
145 (1935).
126. Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Co., 147 F.2d 399, 407 (2d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945).
127. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1945); Subin v. Gold-
smith, 224 F.2d 753, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955).
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as true in the absence of controverting evidence. The court will then rule
that the motion must be decided on the record before it, and not on one
"potentially possible."' 28 This has the effect of forcing the opponent
to produce evidence or lose the case.
The difference in approach between Judge Clark and Judge Frank
is illustrated neatly by the decision in Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v.
Stulvnan-Emrick Co." 9 In that case, plaintiff sought to recover the
balance due on a contract for the sale of lumber. Defendant counter-
claimed for breach of a second contract between the same parties, and
both moved for a summary judgment. The District Court found that
the second contract had been breached and awarded damages to the
defendant. On appeal, the court by Judge Clark affirmed the judgment.
The uncontested facts established that the plaintiff had breached the
contract. The district judge had accepted a statement in a letter written
by the plaintiff as the sole evidence of the market price of the lumber,
and in computing damages, added to this figure the freight charges as
stated in this and other letters also written by the plaintiff. Judge Clark
ruled that it was proper to accept the figures stated in these letters for
the purpose of computing damages since the plaintiff had never challenged
the accuracy of these figures by controverting evidence. Thus the case
stood ". . . as though defendant had offered plaintiff's admissions,
and plaintiff had then rested, with no contradiction or rebuttal of any
kind, and had made its own motion for a directed verdict or peremptory
instruction."' 80 Judge Frank dissented, stating that the letter of the
plaintiff did not constitute a binding admission but that conflicting
inferences were possible. Having resolved this decisive point against
the movant, it followed that a disclosure of evidence by the opponent
was unnecessary since the proponent must in any case fail by reason
of the inadequacy of his own proof.
Probably the opinion most frequently quoted in support of the
argument that the opponent of the motion must take a full disclosure
of evidence is Judge Clark's decision in Engl v. Aetnca Life Insurance
Co.' In that case, the defendant, the party moving for the summary
judgment, supported his pleaded defense of misrepresentation by pro-
ducing the insured's application for insurance showing the denial of
previous physical examinations and the admission of the plaintiff that
such an examination had in fact taken place. Since a full disclosure of
the nature of this examination was prevented by the plaintiff's claim
128. Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Co., sapra note 126, at 405.
129. See note 126 supra.
130. Id. at 405.
131. 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943).
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of privilege, the New York statutory presumption made the misrepresen-
tation material notwithstanding plaintiff's denial by affidavit. Rejecting
plaintiff's argument that evidence could be withheld until trial, Judge
Clark granted a summary judgment for the defendant, ruling that evi-
dence must be produced at the hearing of the motion to enable the court
"to pierce the allegations of fact" in the pleadings and determine if they
are merely formal. Since Judge Clark was willing to accept the proof
offered by the defendant as establishing the material facts of the defense,
such a ruling is understandable in the context of this case. Here the
insurance application and the admission of the plaintiff compelled a
finding for the defendant as a matter of law because of the statutory
presumption. Under these circumstances, the burden of explanation was
quite properly shifted to the plaintiff, but the case is hardly authority
for a requirement of full disclosure in every case where a movant sup-
ports a pleaded claim or defense with credible evidence.
The relationship between the opponent's duty to make a disclosure
of his evidence and the proper application of Federal Rule 56(f) is
apparent.132 If a court is unwilling to rule that the supporting proof
provides an adequate evidentiary basis for judgment, Rule 56(f) does
not become operative.' Since the proponent of the motion fails because
of the inadequacy of his own proof, the burden of producing evidence
or explaining its absence never shifts to the opponent. Federal Rule
56(f) and its cognates in state practice do not become operative until
the moving party satisfies his burden and the duty of producing evidence
shifts to the opponent."4 Of course the opponent may very properly rely
on Rule 56(f) to explain the absence of controverting evidence even
132. Rule 56(f) reads: "Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justi-
fy his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had or may make such other order as is just."
133. Moore believes that such situations are "limited." 6 MOORE, op. cit. supra note
124, § 56.24, at 2344. But see, cases cited note 134 hifra.
134. Compare the limited function of Rule 56(f) in the following cases in which
summary judgment was denied: Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 171 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.
1948) ; Sarkes Tarzian v. United States, 240 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1957), reversing, 140
F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Ind. 1956) ; Slagle v. United States, 228 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1956) ;
Auto Specialties Manufacturing Co. v. Hyde Park Iron Works, 15 F.R.D. 89 (E.D.N.Y.
1953) ; with the treatment accorded the rule in the following cases in which a summary
judgment was granted: Foster v. General Motors Corp., 191 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 906 (1951) ; Lata v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp.
542 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946), re'd
in part, 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947). Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing &
Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 329, 23 F.R. Serv. 56, c. 41, Case 3 (E.D. Wis. 1956) did require
the defendant to resort to Rule 56(f) to justify his opposition to a motion for summary
judgment although issues of credibility were involved in the plaintiff-movant's own
proof.
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though the court would not grant the motion in the absence of such a
showing, and this is undoubtedly the safest practice.' Nevertheless,
failure to invoke Rule 56(f) does not in itself provide a reason for
granting a motion for summary judgment.
The success of a motion for summary judgment thus depends
initially upon the favorable resolution of issues of credibility raised by
the proof presented in support of the motion. If a court finds issues of
credibility in the supporting evidence itself, a summary judgment is
denied irrespective of the production or non-production of evidence by
the opponent of the motion. This is true, notwithstanding judicial pro-
nouncements to the effect that the moving party's version of the case is
to be accepted in the absence of controverting proof. Examination of
these cases reveals that this precept is principally applied in cases where
the supporting evidence is a written contract or some other form of
documentary evidence. 3 ' Courts have been willing to accept the sup-
porting proof in such cases, not only because of the reliability of the
evidence, but also because the opponent of the motion shares knowledge
of the transaction giving rise to the litigation and can be expected to
present evidence if a genuine controversy as to facts exists." 7 When
litigation does not involve mutual transactions and the supporting proof
is testimonial, courts are unwilling to apply any such rule. Judge Frank,
of course, finds issues of credibility whenever proof falls short of unim-
peached documents. Exceptions to this rule are restrictive in the extreme.
135. Hummel v. Riordon, 56 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ill. 1944); Shultz v. Manufac-
turers & Traders Trust Co., 30 F. Supp. 443 (W.D.N.Y. 1939), 32 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.
N.Y. 1940) ; Loew's, Inc. v. Bays, 209 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Colley v. Igoe, 8 F.R.
Serv. 56, c. 41, Case 9 (D.N.J. 1945). Distinguish the related question of granting ad-
ditional time to an opponent to produce controverting evidence. See Goldboss v. Rei-
mann, 44 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line
Co., 41 F. Supp. 334 (D. Del. 1941), rev'd in part, 130 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Hoff-
man v. Lamb Knit Goods Co., 37 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Mich. 1941); Ulen v. American
Airlines, 7 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1947); Poole v. Gillison, 15 F.R.D. 194 (E.D. Ark.
1953).
136. Jefferson Gardens v. Terzan, 216 Wis. 230, 257 N.W. 154 (1934); Rabe v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 391 (D. Mass. 1940); Maltz v. Daly, 120 Misc.
466, 198 N.Y. Supp. 690 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Nolte v. Nannino, 107 N.J.L. 462, 154 AtI. 831
(1931) ; Danenhower v. Birch, Jr., 97 N.J.L. 193, 116 Atl. 786 (1921) ; Hoof v. John
Hunter Corp., 193 N.Y. Supp. 91 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; and cases cited note 123 supra. But
see, Nardo v. Favazza, 110 A.2d 676, 679 (Md. 1955).
137. See text following note 88 supra. American Ins. Co. v. Gentile Bros. Co.,
109 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 633 (1940) ; Board of Public In-
struction for the County of Hernando, State of Florida v. Meredith, 119 F.2d 712 (5th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941) ; Ortiz v. National Liberty Ins. Co. of
America, 75 F. Supp. 550 (D.P.R. 1948); Piantadosi v. Loew's, Inc., 137 F.2d 534
(9th Cir. 1943).
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Only if both parties waive oral testimony,'38 or if testimony is unavail-
able because of the death of a witness 38 has Judge Frank indicated that
the summary judgment procedure is permissible. In courts not adhering
to Judge Frank's rigid standards, the moving party employs various
techniques to remove the credibility issues inherent in testimonial proof."'
It is of the utmost importance for the opponent of the motion to under-
stand these methods, since a failure to present explanatory or controvert-
ing evidence under these circumstances results in a judgment for the
moving party.
The favorite technique for avoiding credibility issues is to secure
admissions for the opponent, and then move for judgment on the basis
of this evidence. In the discussions of the Madeirense and Engl cases,
it was shown that Judge Clark relied on admissions to justify the summary
judgment, and this device has been employed in a number of other
cases.' 4' Typical of these cases is Johnsons TVarehouse v. Yangtfe Trad-
ing Corp.'4 ' Defendant was granted a summary judgment on a counter-
claim for breach of a contract to store certain goods. The court's action
was based on an admission contained in a letter written by plaintiff to
defendant which stated, "We exceedingly regret that this was not placed
in our buildings, as we agreed to do. This is definitely our error and we
do not intend to escape our responsibility."'' An affidavit of the plain-
tiff asserting that the letter was drafted without first investigating the
matter was ignored by the court.
This method is particularly effective in the area where the legal
138. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949). In Sharpe v. Great Lakes
Steel Corp., 9 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), the district judge, heeding Judge Frank's
admonition, interrogated counsel and got the equivalent of a waiver of oral testimony.
139. Campbell v. American Fabrics Co., 168 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1949).
140. To be distinguished are the numerous cases in which the fact finding func-
tion is placed in the hands of some administrative official or agency. See note 6 supra.
141. Bayuk Cigars v. Moshassuck Transp. Co., 105 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ;
United States v. Kellert, 101 F. Supp. 698 (D. Conn. 1951) (admissions pursuant to
Federal Rule 36) ; General Beverages v. Rogers, 216 F.2d 413 (10th Cir. 1954); Jef-
fress v. Weitzman, 221 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Bennett v. Flanigan, 220 F.2d 799
(7th Cir. 1955); S.M.S. Manufacturing Co. v. United States-Mengel Plywoods, 219
F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1955) ; McKinzie v. Huckaby, 112 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Okla. 1953) :
Williams Mfg. Co. v. Prock, 184 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Crisler v. Illinois Central
R. Co., 196 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Durasteel Co. v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 205 F.2d
438 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Jeffe v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 123 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1954) ;
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing & Supply Co., supra note 134 (partial sum-
mary judgment) ; Hunt v. Pick, 240 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1957) (admissions established
laches) ; Knoshaug v. Pollman, 148 F. Supp. 16 (D.N. Dak. 1957), aff'd, 245 F.2d 271
(8th Cir. 1957) ; Fremon v. W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 111 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Iowa
1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Walsh v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 90
F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1950) ; Aktiengesellschaft der Harlander v. Lawrence N\alker
Cotton Co., 60 N.M. 154, 288 P.2d 691 (1955).
142. 100 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
143. Id. at 108.
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duty owed by the defendant is defined in relation to some particular
classification of the plaintiff as trespasser, licensee, invitee, or guest.
For example, in Field v. Sisters of Mercy of Colorado,'44 plaintiff sought
to recover for injuries sustained in a fall in the lobby of a hospital
operated by the defendants. On the basis of the deposition of the plain-
tiff and admissions obtained in a pre-trial conference, a summary judg-
ment was granted for the defendant. In affirming the judgment, the
court classified plaintiff as a licensee, ruled that the duty imposed on the
defendant was to refrain from wilfully injuring the plaintiff, and held
that the plaintiff's deposition established that there was no breach of
that duty.
The credibility issue was avoided in this case by relying on the
plaintiff's own testimony obtained by the defendant through discovery
procedures to establish the factual basis of the action. The court then
classified the plaintiff in a particular category and defined the duty owed,
an admittedly judicial function. The plaintiff's own evidence proved
that the duty as thus defined had not been breached and hence that
judgment might be entered for the defendant as a matter of law. Similar
results have been reached in cases of trespassers, 145 guests,14' and
gratuitous passengers. 4 Thus the category system, originally developed
as a method of judicial control to protect landowners from the feared
irresponsibility of juries,' serves an identical function in the summary
judgment cases by permitting a disposition as a matter of law without
a trial of the issues.
in negligence cases where the moving party does not have the ad-
vantage of the precisely defined duties of the category system, but must
prove compliance or non-compliance with the generalized standard o
reasonable care, a ruling as a matter of law is much more difficult. Not
only is it much harder to get any significant agreement as to the facts, but,
in addition, even when the facts are undisputed, the inference of negli-
144. 126 Colo. 1, 245 P.2d 1167 (1952). See also Barrett v. Faltico, 117 F. Supp.
95 (E.D. Wash. 1953); Lauchert v. American S.S. Co., 65 F. Supp. 703 (W.D.N.Y.
1946). Whether defendant's conduct does constitute a breach of the duty owed may be
a jury question. Concho Const. Co. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 201 F.2d 673 (10th
Cir. 1953) ; Jacob-v. Pennsylvania R.R., 203 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1953).
145. Hollinghead v. Carter Oil Co., 221 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1955); cf. Hahn v.
United States Airlines, 127 F. Supp. 950 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (admission by defendant of
a trespass permitted entry of summary judgment for plaintiff).
146. Allen v. Keck, 212 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1954); Warner v. Lieberman, 154 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Wis. 1957) ; cf. MacMaugh v. Baldwin, 239 F.2d 67 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
1W. Alderman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 113 F. Supp 881 (S.D.W. Va. 1953);
cf. Hufner v. Erie R.R., 26 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (employer's liability limited
to wilful or wahton misconduct of employee toward a passenger).
148. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 128 n.56 (1930).
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gence in these cases is ordinarily left for the jury.14 Nevertheless, it
may still be possible for the movant to get a summary judgment by
establishing a standard of conduct as a matter of law.
Statutory regulations afford a good illustration of this possibility.
A regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Board requires a commercial air
transport to travel at a certain altitude over mountains. Violation of
such a regulation is negligence per se, and a jury would be so instructed.
If the defendant admits in discovery proceedings that a flight plan was
approved which called for the airplane to fly at less than the approved
minimum altitude, a trial is unnecessary and a summary disposition is
proper. The defendant's own testimony, taken in conjunction with the
admitted physical facts of the accident, establish the factual basis of the
litigation, and these facts conclusively show a failure to comply with
the applicable standard of conduct. 5 '
In other cases, the required standard of care may result from court
decisions. Thus driving into the side of a train known to be across an
intersection is negligence as a matter of law. Under such circumstance,
in Zamora v. Thompson,1 ' defendant moved for a summary judgment
based on proof of plaintiff's contributory negligence. Defendant had
taken the plaintiff's deposition, and in answer to the question, "When you
first saw the train, it was on the crossing?", the plaintiff replied, "That
is right." The court ruled that the plaintiff is bound by his own testimony
based on personal observation when he did nothing to retract, modify,
or explain it. This testimony established that the plaintiff ran into the
side of a train which he knew was across the highway and since such con-
duct is negligence as a matter of law, the court was able to rule for the
defendant without submitting the issue of contributory negligence to a
jury.
Fatal admissions may be found in the opponent's letter or in contro-
verting proof,15 3 but as these cases indicate, the effectiveness of this
method of avoiding issues of credibility depends in large measure upon
an extensive pre-trial discovery procedure. Utilization of these pro-
cedures may reveal damaging admissions, but a summary judgment will
not be granted unless the admission is conclusive. Thus if plaintiff's
149. See cases cited note 169 infra and Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482, 70 N.W.2d
351 (1955) ; Roucher v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1956).
150. American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also Hart-
sell v. Hickman, 148 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Ark. 1957).
151. 250 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). See also Lindgren v. Sparks, 239
Minn. 222, 58 N.W.2d 317 (1953).
152. Zamora v. Thompson, supra note 151, at 628.
153. See cases cited note 141 supra, particularly Bennett v. Flanigan and Crisler
v. Illinois Central Ry.
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deposition merely fails to support his pleaded claim without making a
fatal admission showing its invalidity, it has been held that summary
judgment will not be granted since the plaintiff is not required to prove
his case at a pre-trial hearing.154 Moreover, the court will carefully
examine an allegedly fatal admission to be certain that it really is con-
clusive.155 Thus Judge Frank in the Madeirensel" case found that con-
flicting inferences could be drawn from a letter which Judge Clark
regarded as conclusive on the disputed issue of damages.
If a conclusive admission on a material issue is made in a deposition,
it is reasonable to shift the burden of producing explanatory evidence
to the opponent if he is to avoid a summary judgment. Thus in the
Zamora case, the Texas court granted a summary judgment only after
carefully stating that the plaintiff had failed to explain or modify his
original testimony. Preservation of the deponent's right to explain
damaging admissions in summary judgment proceedings affords a
litigant an equivalent opportunity to that provided at a trial where adverse
testimony may be explained by later questioning.
I If in addition to damaging admissions or other weaknesses in the
opponent's ,proof, the court finds that the facts relating to the material
issue in dispute are peculiarly within the knowledge of the party opposing
the motion, the court is much more willing to grant a summary judg-
ment.15  In one such case, Herzog, v. Des Lauriers Steel Moudd, Co.,'
the issue raised was whether defendant had actively participated in a prior
suit and was. therefore bound by the judgment. The only evidence that
the plaintiff, the moving party, could produce was that the attorney for
the defendant had. actively participated in the presentation of the prior
action. Defendant filed no counter-affidavits, but contented itself with
an attack on that part of the plaintiff's affidavits made without personal
knowledge. In granting a summary judgment, the court said: "It is un-
contradicted that counsel for defendant in this present proceeding actually
154. Pelon v. Becco, 253 Wis. 278, 34 N.W.2d 236 (1948); Southern Rendering
Co. v. Standard Rendering Co., 112 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Ark. 1953) ; William Goldman
Theatres v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 151 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; cf.
Huff v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 198 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1952).
155. • Traylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, 189 F.2d 213 (8th. Cir. 1947) ; Caylor v.
Virden, 217 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Coe v. Riley, 160 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1947)
Hartsell- v. Hickman, supra note 150. - - -
156. See note 129 supra.
157. See Frank, J., in Dixon v. American-Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 F.2d'863, 864 (2d
Cir. 1947),, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947) ; Lawson v. American Motorists Ins. Corp.,
217 F.2d 724 (5th Cir, 1954) ; River Plate & Brazil Conf. v. Pressed Steel Car' Co., 227
F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1955); Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228,
16 N.W.2d 787 (1944); cf. Sucknow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consolidated, "185
F.2d 196, 205 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943..(1951).
158. 46 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
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participated actively in the trial of that action. Since it would have been
so simple a matter for the defendant to have created a genuine issue as to
the party whose interests were actually being represented by Mr. Goshorn
in that proceeding and as to who had undertaken to pay his fee for his
services therein, and since defendant studiously avoided doing so, I feel
that this court should not be required to relitigate the issues." '159
The possession of knowledge by the opponent justifies shifting the
burden of producing evidence just as in the cases considered previously
where the parties shared knowledge of commercial transactions. In addi-
tion, however, there are other factors in these cases attesting to the
authenticity of the proof offered by the moving party. In the Herzog
case, this was found in the undisputed fact that defendant's lawyer
actively participated in the prior trial. It may be found in admissions
of the opponent or in the type of evidence offered by the movant. Thus
in United States v. 162 10/12 Cases,6 ' the United States offered, in
support of its motion for judgment of forfeiture of whiskey concealed
to avoid the payment of taxes, the report of government investigators, a
guilty plea in a criminal prosecution, copies of the tax returns of the
owner of the whiskey, and an admission by him that he had lied to the
officers. In granting the summary judgment the court observed that
since all relevant information was in the owner's hand, he could not
remain silent and rely on cross-examination and demeanor.
As the above case indicated, courts have asserted that the statements
of a "responsible public official" must be accepted as true in the absence
of controverting evidence.'' While this rule may be supportable on its
own merits, the cases again either have the additional factor of knowledge
peculiarly within the hands of the opponent of the motion, or involve a
situation where it is apparent that the court believes the plaintiff, the
opponent of the motion, will be unable to produce evidence substantiating
his claim. The latter factor presents a distinct problem which will be
discussed subsequently. 6
A less frequent but well recognized method of avoiding an issue of
credibility utilizes the familiar "incontrovertible physical facts" test
applied by courts in justifying directed verdicts.'6 3 An example is Miller
159. Id. at 213-14.
160. 138 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
161. Kantarof v. Orsecki, 102 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Morgan v. Sylvester,
125 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); cf. Morgan v Null, 120 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
162. See Part II, infra.
163. See Bornscheueur v. Consolidated Traction Co., 198 Pa. 332, 334, 47 Atl.
872 (1901) ; MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944).
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v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,'" where plaintiff sought to recover for
injuries sustained in a collision at a railway crossing having an admittedly
unobstructed view. In opposing the motion of the defendant for a sum-
mary judgment based on contributory negligence, an affidavit filed by
the plaintiff asserted that he had stopped and looked before he had
attempted to cross the right of way. In granting the summary judgment
for the defendant, the court ruled that under applicable law plaintiff
was "... presumed to have seen what was clearly visible."' 65 Thus he
must have either failed to look, or disregarded what he saw, and in either
case, he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. In this situation, the
proponent is able to shift the burden of producing evidence by relying on
the physical facts of the occurrence to establish the affirmative defense.
In attempting to satisfy the burden thus imposed, the opposing party faces
the familiar rule that evidence may be disregarded if it conflicts with
the established physical facts. 6
There are other cases in which the court shifted the burden of pro-
ducing evidence to the opponent although apparently the credibility issue
of the movant's proof was not avoided by any of the factors previously
mentioned. 6  Of these cases, Thomas v. Mutual Benefit Health and Acci-
dent Ass'i, 6 involves an interesting question. In that case, Judge Clark
required the defendant to take depositions or use other discovery pro-
cedures to determine the truthfulness of plaintiff's assertion that a loss
was not covered by other insurance, ruling that it was not enough to
doubt the accuracy of plaintiff's deposition. While the case does represent
the well-known view of Judge Clark that there must be a full disclosure
of proof at the hearing of a motion for summary judgment, the burden
of pleading and proof on the asserted issue of fact appeared to rest on the
164. 196 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1952). Cf. Miller v. Aitkin, 160 Neb. 97, 69 N.W.2d
290 (1955). (In addition. to the physical facts of the accident, the court relied on the
plaintiff's own deposition in ruling that there was contributory negligence as a matter
of law).
165. Miller v. Union Pac. R.R., supra note 164, at 334-35.
166. See Bornscheueur v. Consolidated Traction Co., stepra note 163; Danks v.
Pittsburgh Ry., 328 Pa. 356, 195 Atl. 16 (1937).
167. See Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, supra note 123. Such
familiar cases as Sanders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Tex. 1939);
Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947); and Compania De Remorque y
Salvamento v. Esperance, 187 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1951) involve granting summary judg-
ment to a defendant. Special considerations applying to this situation will be developed
in Part II.
168. 220 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1955). In the opposite situation, where plaintiffs have
failed to produce evidence supporting alternative theories of recovery, decisions are in
accord with that reached in the Thomas case. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Continental Record Co., 222 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 861 (1955) ;
Virginia Metal Prod. Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 219 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1955) ;
Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Woody, 47 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1942).
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defendant. While the formal pleading issues are not controlling in a
summary judgment proceeding, if the plaintiff-movant supports his cause
of action with undisputed evidence and there is neither pleading nor
proof of an asserted affirmative defense, judgment may be entered on
the assumption that no such defense exists, just as the case would be at a
trial. Even Judge Frank has not indicated that a plaintiff would have
to disprove all affirmative defenses in order to remove the "slightest
doubt."
Although credibility issues may be avoided, it does not necessarily
follow that judgment may be entered as a matter of law merely because the
evidentiary facts are undisputed. In cases where there is a right to jury
trial, the ultimate facts to be inferred from the agreed evidentiary facts
might still present an issue for trial. Not only in tort cases," 9 but in
contract cases as well, 7 " summary judgment has been denied because
reasonable men could draw conflicting inferences from undisputed
evidence. If the court rules that reasonable men could draw but one con-
clusion from the conceded evidentiary facts, the question again becomes
one of law on well-recognized principles and the case is proper for a sum-
mary judgment.'
When the inference to be drawn from the facts is for the court rather
than a jury, a different rule prevails. Assuming that there is no dispute
as to the evidence, a number of courts have decided that the judge may
dispose of the case summarily by drawing inferences as to the material
facts without the formality of a trial. 2 This is permissible only in cases
169. Lavin v. Goldberg Building Material Corp., 274 App. Div. 690, 87 N.Y.S.2d
90 (3d Dep't 1949) ; Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 887 (1951) ; see United States v. General Ry. Signal Co., 110 F. Supp. 422,
425 (W.D.N.Y. 1952); Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R.R., 135 F.2d 101, 106 (8th Cir.
1943). Compare Elmer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 257 Wis. 228, 43 N.W.2d 244 (1950),
with Petri v. Roberts, 242 Wis. 539, 8 N.W. 2d 355 (1943).
170. See cases cited note 47 supra and Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181
F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United States, 240 F.2d 467
(7th Cir. 1957) ; Winter Park Tel. Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 F.2d 341
(5th Cir. 1950) ; Bertlee Co. v. Illinois Publ. & Print Co., 320 Ill. App. 490, 52 N.E.2d
47 (1943); Federal Terra Cotta Co. v. Margolies, 215 App. Div. 651, 211 N.Y. Supp.
876 (1st Dep't 1925) Frazier v. Glenns Falls Indemnity Co., 278 S.W.2d, 388 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955).
171. Rogers v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 138 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1943) ; R. I.
Recreational Center v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949).
172. Fox v. Johnson & Wimsatt, 127 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Tripp v. May,
189 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.
Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Dickheiser v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 5
F.R.D. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808
(1947). But see, United States v. Dollar, 196 F.2d 551, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1952). Compare
Seaboard Surety Co. v. Racine Screw Co., 203 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1953) (holding that
specific performance was discretionary and therefore could not be granted on motion
for summary judgment), with Dale v. Preg, 204 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1953) (granting
specific performance). Summary judgment cannot be granted unless the court has be-
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where the evidentiary facts are not disputed. Apparently no distinction
is made between court and jury-tried cases in determining the existence
of issues of credibility, for it is equally important in both cases to have
the benefit of demeanor evidence and cross-examination in open court."'
No discussion of summary judgment is complete without consider-
ation of the notorious standard of the Third Circuit first propounded in
Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraf Corp."7 4 The court there stated that:
"It is well-settled that on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment,
affidavits filed in their support may be considered for the purpose of
ascertaining whether an issue of fact is presented, but they cannot be used
as a basis for deciding the fact issue. An affidavit cannot be treated, for
purposes of the motion to dismiss, as proof contradictory to well-pleaded
facts in the complaint.
'1 75
Literally applied, the rule in the Hart case precludes a summary
judgment in every case where pleadings form issues of fact for trial irre-
spective of the proof offered by the moving party in support of his
motion for summary judgment. Thus summary judgment in the Third
Circuit is a very much restricted procedure, limited to cases where there
is agreement as to the facts. When the parties stipulate or otherwise
agree as to the facts,176 or present to the court an issue of law involving
the interpretation of a contract, 7 a summary judgment is permissible.
fore it all of the evidence from which the inference of ultimate fact is to be made. See
McComb v. Southern Weighing & Inspection Bureau, 170 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1948).
173. See Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1949); Parish v. Awschu
Properties, 247 Wis. 166, 174-75, 19 N.W.2d 276 (1945).
174. 169 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1948). The court relied on two earlier cases decided
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia-Farrell v. District of Columbia
Amateur Athletic Union, 153 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1946), and Garrett Biblical Institute
v. American University, 163 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1947). All three cases were correctly
decided because issues of fact were raised by controverting evidence. It was therefore
unnecessary for the court to rely on this unfortunate rule in reaching a decision in
these cases.
175. Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraf Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1948).
176. R.F.C. v. Foust Distilling Co., 103 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Pa. 1952); Schwob v.
International Water Corp., 136 F. Supp. 310 (D. Del. 1955) ; Abramson v. Delrose, 132
F. Supp. 440 (D. Del. 1955) (partial summary judgment); cf. St. Louis Fire and
Marine Ins. Co. v. Witney, 96 F. Supp. 555 (M.D. Pa. 1951) (interpreting application
of the provisions of an insurance contract to undisputed facts) ; Hemmerle v. Hobby,
114 F. Supp. 16 (D.N.J. 1953) (referee's findings) ; United States v. St. Paul-Mercury
Indemnity Co., 194 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1952) (interpretation of bond provisions, facts
undisputed); United States v. Carpenter, 147 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Pa. 1957) (validity
of an order, facts undisputed); United States v. Logan Co., 147 F. Supp. 330 (W.D.
Pa. 1957) (issue raised became moot).
177. New Wrinkle v. John L. Armitage & Co., 238 F.2d 753 (3d Cir. 1956);
American Auto Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 108 F. Supp. 221
(E.D. Pa. 1952) (insurance policy) ; Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir.
1953) ; Glade Mountain. Corp. v. R.F.C, 200 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Woods v. Golt,
92 F. Supp. 325 (D. Del. 1950); Wildlife Preserves v. Algonquin Gas Transmission
Co., 113 F. Supp. 112 (D.N.J. 1953) ; Von Mailath v.. Order of Daughters, 117 -F. -Supp.
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Occasionally, the motion is used as a substitute for a motion for judgment
on the pleadings."' In other cases, a strict application of the rule prevents
a summary disposition of the case although the opponent of the motion
does nothing but rely on his pleadings.'
The dissatisfaction of the district courts with this rule is evidenced
by the almost constant attempts made to distinguish or ignore the Hart
case. Thus in Wise v. Universal Corporation, s ° a summary judgment
based on a contract and affidavit was granted to the defendant although
this evidence was contrary to "well pleaded" allegations in the complaint.
In Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Cusick,"'1 a summary judgment was granted
to the plaintiff on the defendant's well-pleaded counterclaim although the
supporting proof was solely affidavit evidence. The Vanity Fair case is
particularly interesting because the district judge gave a new interpreta-
tion to the Hart case. Contrary to what everyone thought, the court
ruled that: "The Hart case goes no further than to require that in the
search for fact issues the court must also consider those facts contained
in the pleadings and cannot require that they be reiterated in affidavit
form. The Hart case is not authority for the proposition for which the
defendants seek to use it- that the conclusory allegations of the counter-
claim, denied by plaintiff, raise fact issues foreclosing the grant of sum-
mary judgment. The Hart case merely broadens the area in which the
search for fact issues must be made; it in no way impairs the principle
that specific, basic facts must be alleged and controverted before the
'genuine' issue contemplated by Rule 56 arises. This requirement is of
93 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Motor Terminals v. National Car Co., 92 F. Supp. 155 (D. Del.
1949); Smith v. McDonald, 116 F. Supp. 158 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Louis Stern Sons v.
Adolph Gobel, 113 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.J. 1953); cf. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Permutit Co.,
114 F. Supp. 846 (D. Del. 1953) (act of infringement charged in the complaint ad-
mittedly occurred after the lawsuit was filed) ; see F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. Brownell,
209 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1954). If the contract is ambiguous, a summary judgment may
not be granted. See Rolle Mfg. Co. v. Marco Chemicals, 92 F. Supp. 218 (D.N.J. 1950).
178. United States v. Cless, 150 F. Supp. 687 (M.D. Pa. 1957) ; cf. Hackensack
Water Co. v. North Bergen Tp., 103 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1952), aff'd, 200 F.2d 313
(3d Cir. 1952) (want of federal jurisdiction) ; Carroll v. Pittsburg Steel Co., 103 F.
Supp. 788 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (statute of limitations) ; Pollack v. City of Newark, 147
F. Supp. 35 (D.N.J. 1956), aff'd, 248 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1957) (complaint drafted by a
layman).
179. See in particular Leigh v. Barnhart, 10 F.R.D. 279 (D.N.J. 1950); United
States v. Bernauer, 10 F.R.D. 400 (D.N.J. 1950) ; Dimet Proprietary, Ltd. v. Industrial
Metal Protectives, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 472 (D. Del. 1952) ; Michel v. Meier, 8 F.R.D.
464 (W.D. Pa. 1948); F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. Brownell, 209 F.2d 375, 379 (3d
Cir. 1954).
180. 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950). See also United States v. Krasnov, 143 F.
Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 5 (1957); (Hart case does not apply to
undisputed documentary evidence); Sauters v. Young, 118 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Pa.
1954) (letters).
181. 143 F. Supp. 452 (D.N.J. 1956).
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course not satisfied by the generalities contained in the counterclaim." '18 2
While giving credit to Judge Forman for a good try, it is impossible
to reconcile this interpretation of the Hart case with the explanation of it
given for the benefit of another New Jersey district judge by the Third
Circuit in Reynolds Metal Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co."3  There the
court specifically stated that the truth or falsity of pleading allegations
could not be determined by a pre-trial proceeding. The report of the
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure recommending a
change in Federal Rule 56 is certainly premised on this interpretation of
the holding of the Hart case.'
In adhering to the accepted interpretation of the rule of the Hart
case the Third Circufit has received a full measure of criticism if not
downright abuse in legal periodicals. 5 as well as from the Advisory
Committee itself.' Clearly, the rule as stated ignores the history of the
summary judgment procedure, for historically Keating's Act was pre-
cisely designed to eliminate a trial in cases where the pleadings did form
factual issues for trial.187 In the court's anxiety to prevent injustice by
denying a trial to a worthy litigant, the progress of a century of pro-
cedural reform was ignored. A real problem exists in guarding against
the use of the procedure to unjustly deny a litigant a trial, but what the
Third Circuit failed to discern is that the solution to this problem lies in
a proper discrimination between types of cases and methods of proof,
and not in the adoption of a blanket policy denying summary judgment in
every case adequately pleaded.
The dangers of the Third Circuit rule as a precedent may be over
emphasized, however.' Condemnation of the Hart case has been so uni-
versal that it is at least doubtful that any other circuit will accept the de-
cision as controlling. While the case has been cited many times, in the
182. Id. at 458. It is significant that in both the Vanity Fair and Wise cases, the
moving party was the defendant of the claim and it was clearly established that the
claim could not be supported by proof. On this point, see also Van Brode Milling Co.
v. Kellogg Co., 132 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1955) and Lewis v. Clarence Coal Mining
Co., 130 F. Supp. 909 (M.D. Pa. 1955). The significance of this factor is explored
in Part II.
183. 176 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1949).
184. Note to RULE 56, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES
FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, October, 1955.
185. Wright, Ride 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending the Federal
Rules, 69 HARV. L. REv. 839, 843 (1956) ; Asbill & Snell, Summary Judgment Under the
Federal Rules-When an Issue of Fact is Presented, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1143, 1159-65
(1953) ; Note, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 212, 214-15 (1950) ; Note, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 370, 375
(1956).
186. See REPORT, supra note 184.
187. See Bauman, supra note 3.
188. Wright, supra note 185, at 854-57.
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cases examined in which the rule is quoted, there existed independently
of it adequate grounds for a denial of the motion.18
II
Thus far no consideration has been given to the order of proof im-
posed by the procedural law and the effect that it may have on the dispo-
sition of a motion for a summary judgment. Both plaintiff and defend-
ant have been regarded as proponents of an issue of fact with identical
problems of proof. In an ordinary trial, however, the defendant need
do nothing until the plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving all the
material propositions constituting his claim."' Thus a defendant's bur-
den of proof at trial is conditioned upon the ability of the plaintiff to
sustain his burden, and the defendant may win a lawsuit solely because
of the plaintiff's failure to sustain that burden. The effect given to this
factor in disposing of defendant's motion for summary judgment re-
mains to be considered.
Suppose a defendant moves for a summary judgment on the basis of
a denial of one of the material propositions of fact constituting the plain-
tiff's case. What quantum of evidence must the defendant produce to
satisfy the court that there is no disputed issue of fact? While it seems
clear that the defendant ". . . cannot push the other party out of court
by swearing he has no case," '191 suppose the pleaded denial is supported by
affidavits and depositions tending to establish the non-existence of an
essential fact. Standards employed in ordinary trial procedure are in-
appropriate to test the adequacy of such proof, since these standards are
designed to provide a preliminary test of the sufficiency of plaintiff's
evidence. Thus the defendant must satisfy a standard, unique to sum-
mary judgment proceedings, that requires proof of the "absence of any
genuine issue" as to a material fact, or, perhaps, that there is not the
"slightest doubt" as to the disputed facts. If the defendant's proof fails
189. The decisions in the Farrell and Garrett cases, szpra note 174, were limited
to their facts by Dewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1950), which in effect re-
pudiated the rule in the District of Columbia. The decisions of Judge Delehant in
United States v. Association of Am. Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510 (D. Neb. 1945) ; Andrews
v. Heinzman, 9 F.R.D. 7 (D. Neb. 1949); and Chenault v. Nebraska Farm Products,
Inc., 107 F. Supp. 635 (D. Neb. 1952), appear to follow the Third Circuit rule, but
are as readily explainable on the basis of the court's unwillingness to accept the credi-
bility of the moving party's evidence in these cases. The same comment can be made
with reference to Thomas v. Martin, 8 F.R.D. 638 (E.D. Tenn. 1949); Hoffman v.
Babbitt Bros. Trading Co., 203 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1953); John W. Shaw Advertising,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 112 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1953); and Gunn v. Association of
Cas. & Surety Executives, 16 F.R. Serv. 713 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
190. Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact, 34 COLUmn. L. REv. 1224,
1256-59 (1934).
191. Belanger v. Hopeman Bros., 6 F.R.D. 459 (S.D. Me. 1947).
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to satisfy the prescribed standard, may plaintiff safely ignore the mo-
tion, or notwithstanding the deficiency in defendant's proof, will a court
impose on the plaintiff the burden of disclosing his evidence? If the
burden of presenting evidence is imposed on the plaintiff, either because
the defendant's proof has the required persuasiveness or for some other
reason, must the plaintiff produce sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case, as he would in an ordinary trial, or is it sufficient for the
plaintiff to merely raise doubts as to the credibility of defendant's proof?
The answers to these questions have produced a considerable divergence
of opinion in the administration of the summary judgment procedure.
Arnstein v. Porter,"2 a familiar case, is a good introduction to the
problems involved. Plaintiff brought an action charging the defendant
with infringement of plaintiff's copyrights to several musical composi-
tions. After depositions were taken by both parties, defendant moved
for summary judgment on the basis of these depositions and certain af-
fidavits. In his affidavit, defendant categorically denied that he had
heard or seen the plaintiff's music. Plaintiff filed a controverting affi-
davit asserting that his music had been played and heard by many people,
that defendant had stooges watching plaintiff, and that some of his mu-
sical compositions had been stolen. No positive proof was presented,
however, establishing that the defendant had actually had access to the
compositions. A district court granted a summary judgment for the de-
fendant, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment.
Speaking for the majority, Judge Frank stated that summary judgment
was not proper if there was the slightest doubt as to the facts and that
the correctness of an order granting summary judgment depended upon
whether a trial judge could properly have directed a verdict for the mov-
ant at the close of a trial. Having previously decided that there were
slight similarities between the compositions, it was held that a summary
judgment for the defendant would be proper on the issue of copying only
if there had been no access to plaintiff's compositions. Since the affi-
davits were conflicting on this point, an issue of credibility was involved
and thus a material issue of fact was formed for trial. Rejecting the
argument that plaintiff must produce evidence, Judge Frank stated: "It
will not do, in such a case, to say that, since the plaintiff, in the matter
presented by his affidavits, has offered nothing which discredits the
honesty of the defendant, the latter's depositions must be accepted as
true.""' 3  Judge Clark, in a caustic dissenting opinion characterizing the
192. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
193. Id. at 471. Compare the opinion upholding a summary judgment for defend-
ant in Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1957) (where a tenuous claim
to a fund was rejected for lack of proof).
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decision as "anti-intellectual," asserted that the motion was properly
granted since the similarities in the compositions were trivial and the
plaintiff had failed to produce any positive evidence of access worthy of
submission to a trier of fact.
The opinion is interesting because the defendant produced all of the
evidence available to him. He denied copying and he denied access. Al-
though it is possible to find a conflict between the affidavits of the
parties, plaintiff's evidence failed to establish a prima facie claim
against the defendant and tended to prove only that access by some per-
son was possible. Applying the directed verdict test, Judge Frank denied
summary judgment principally because the proof of the defendant need
not have been believed by a jury. Since defendant's proof was not ac-
cepted as true, the court did not require the plaintiff to produce evidence
either for the purpose of attacking the credibility of defendant's proof or
to establish a prima facie case. Thus the effect of the decision was to
deny a summary judgment to a defendant because supporting proof in
the form of testimonial evidence failed to satisfy the standard prescribed
for decisions as a matter of law. Since Judge Clark found no significant
similarities in the compositions, he decided that the defendant had sus-
tained his burden, and thus he would require the plaintiff to produce
evidence establishing the existence of the claim in order to prevent a sum-
mary disposition of the case.
The Arnsteib case not only illustrates the difficulty faced by the de-
fendant in satisfying the burden of proof imposed upon him by Judge
Frank and his adherents, but also lays bare the decisive nature of the de-
termination of the adequacy of that proof. It is not significant that a
plaintiff-opponent has failed to sustain his burden of proof, or even that
he has failed to produce evidence at all, until the defendant's own evidence
satisfies whatever standard the court chooses to apply to it. Thus in the
Arnstein case, the defensive position of the defendant is ignored and the
supporting proof is subjected to standards identical with those applied to
the proof of a proponent-movant discussed in Part I. Failure to produce
sufficient evidence to satisfy the standard imposed results in a denial of
the motion."'
Under what circumstances does the defendant satisfy the burden im-
194. See also, Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 883 (1955) ; Alvado v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 983 (1956); cf. Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) ("Here, however, if I should decide that plaintiffs have not sustained the burden
of proof, it does not follow that defendants can get summary judgment. They can not
get summary judgment, as distinguished from judgment after trial, unless they meet
the 'slightest doubt' test. That they have not accomplished.")
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posed upon him and shift the burden of going forward with the evidence
to the plaintiff? No precedents can be found in English practice to help
in answering this question, for the English procedural rules have always
restricted summary judgment to plaintiffs.'95 New York practice, on the
other hand, is instructive since it does permit the defendant to move for
summary judgment in any case in which a defense is established by docu-
mentary evidence,19 and the term "defense" is interpreted to include
everything that defeats the plaintiff's claim. Hence in New York a de-
fendant relying solely on a negative defense may move for summary
judgment if the denial can be substantiated by documentary evidence."'
A preliminary question as to the conclusiveness of such evidence remains
for the court's resolution, 9' of course, but when the defendant does sup-
port his denial with documentary evidence, the court accepts the proof as
establishing, prima facie, a defense to the action."' The plaintiff is then
left with no alternative but to attack the verity of the documents if he is
to resist the motion successfully."' Suppose, for example, a case in
which the issue of insolvency is material, and the defendant moves for
summary judgment on the basis of its books showing that it is not in-
solvent. By deciding that the books are conclusive on this issue, the
court eliminates other questions from the hearing of the motion. The
burden of producing evidence is shifted to the plaintiff, who must pro-
duce "some" evidence attacking the verity of the books or lose.20' There
is no indication in the cases that a plaintiff has the further burden of
substantiating his claim with evidence,0 2 however logical such a require-
ment may be. Thus these cases are decided on the same principles that
govern the cases previously considered where a proponent of an issue
relied on documents in moving for summary judgment and demonstrate
again the readiness of courts to find that unimpeached documentary evi-
195. ANNUAL PRACTICE, 1956, Order XIV & XIVB; Bauman, The Evolution of the
Summary Judgment Procedure, 31 IND. L.J. 329, 341 (1956).
196. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. 113, amended March 14, 1932, June 15, 1933, and Sept. 15,
1944. See Lederer v. Wise Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 459, 12 N.E.2d 544 (1938), and Part I,
notes 48-49 supra.
197. Levine v. Behn, 282 N.Y. 120, 25 N.E.2d 871 (1940). See APPLETON, NEw
YORK PRAcTICE 178-79 (4th ed. 1953).
198. See, e.g., Levine v. Behn, supra note 197 and cases cited note 46 supra.
199. White v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 256 App. Div. 1044, 10 N.Y.S.2d
962 (4th Dep't 1939); see Dunckel v. Parsons, 274 App. Div. 539, 544, 86 N.Y.S.2d
543, 548 (3d Dep't 1948).
200. See N.Y.R. Civ. Pp~c. 113. The complaint may be dismissed unless the
plaintiff produces evidence "sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the verity and
conclusiveness of such documentary evidence ... " See cases cited notes 40-43, and
note 50 supra.
201. White v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., supra note 199. See Deitch v.
Atlas, 140 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
202. See cases cited note 201 supra and Rule 113, supra note 200.
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dence satisfies the burden of proof imposed on the moving party.20 3
Even Judge Frank has recognized this possibility.
2 4
Some of the most fascinating problems in the application of the sum-
mary judgment procedure arise when the defendant's supporting proof
is not documentary, but, as in the Arnstein case, testimonial. Again it is
possible to judge such proof by the same standards applied to the proof
of a proponent-movant, and this is precisely what Judge Frank did in the
Arnstein case.20 ' Even if the extreme standards of Judge Frank are not
followed, courts may find triable issues raised by the supporting proof
itself.0 6 Thus defendants who must support denials with testimonial
evidence frequently resort to the techniques developed in Part I for
avoiding objectionable issues of credibility. 2 7  In cases where both
parties have participated in and share knowledge of the transaction which
gave rise to the litigation, a court may find that the plaintiff's failure to
offer evidence substantiating the claim is a sufficient guarantee of the
truthfulness of the defendant-movant's proof. 28 As might be expected,
however, the typical method of proceeding is to support the motion with
damaging or conclusive admissions of the plaintiff obtained in discovery
proceedings.2 0 Once the supporting proof is found to comply with appli-
cable standards, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the plaintiff,
who must produce evidence sufficient to raise triable issues of fact if
the motion is to be defeated.210
Thus the defendant-movant relying on negative defenses may satisfy
the burden of proof imposed on him either by presenting documentary
evidence in support of the motion or by resorting to the methods discussed
203. See text at note 50 supra. For additional authority consult Miller v. United
States, 144 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Ga. 1956) (court martial record); Brooks v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., 187 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 837 (1951) (bill of
lading and letter) ; Marion County Cooperative Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 214 F.2d 557
(8th Cir. 1954) (records) ; Chambers & Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 224 F.2d
338 (5th Cir. 1955) (written instruments) ; Hisel v. Chrysler Corp., 94 F. Supp. 996
(W.D. Mo. 1951) (letters and exhibits).
204. Subin v. Goldsmith, sapra note 194, at 759-60; Arnstein v. Porter, supra note
192, at 471.
205. See text in Part I at notes 89-99 supra and Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873
(2d Cir. 1949).
206. Mitchell v. McCarty, 239 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1957) (issues raised by affida-
vits preclude summary judgment) ; Ellison v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954) (ad-
missions failed to remove the issue of speed).
207. See text in Part I at notes 141-68 supra.
208. Wolfe v. Union Transfer & Storage Co., 48 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ky. 1942).
209. See, e.g., Burgert v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1957) ; Walder
v. Paramount Public Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; Ortiz v. National Lib-
erty Ins. Co. of America, 75 F. Supp. 550 (D.P.R. 1948) ; Payne v. B-Line Cab Co.,
382 S.W.2d 342 (Ky. 1955) ; Northern v. Elledge, 72 Ariz. 166, 232 P.2d 111 (1951)
Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953).
210. See cases cited notes 208, 209 supra.
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in Part I for avoiding objectionable credibility 'issues in testimonial
evidence. As an alternative to these familiar techniques, a court might
adopt a policy of accepting the truthfulness of defendant's supporting
proof if the plaintiff fails to present controverting evidence at the hear-
ing of the motion. Adoption of such a policy means that credibility
issues inherent in the defendant's supporting proof are to be resolved
in his favor and that summary judgment may be based thereon unless
the plaintiff discloses'evidence substantiating the claim.
Maltby v. Shook,21 demonstrates the operation of such a policy.
In that case, plaintiff sought to recover money paid by his assignor on
checks made payable to Royal Machine Works, and endorsed by Shook,
its bookkeeper. Plaintiff alleged that Shook had authority to endorse
the checks and that Royal was negligent in not detecting the falsification
of its records. Defendants, the owners of Royal, denied liability, and
moved for summary judgment on the basis of their affidavits denying
the authority of Shook to endorse the checks and the affidavit of the
firm's accountant that there were no signs of irregularities in the books
kept by Shook. Plaintiff's opposing affidavit was made by his attorney,
who stated not only that there were indications in defendants' depositions
that Shook had authority, but also that a secretary of Royal had stated
that Shook was a partner in Royal. The court, in affirming judgment
for the defendants, ruled that plaintiff's proof was inadequate because
the affidavit was not made on personal knowledge and contained hearsay
evidence. Defendants' evidence was sufficient to support a judgment
whereas plaintiff failed to show the existence of a good cause of action
by competent evidence.
Another case of this type is Orvis v. Brickma. 212 Plaintiff sought
to recover damages for false imprisonment against a number of persons
including certain hospital authorities. Applicable law precluded recovery
against such persons unless it was shown that they had knowledge of the
plaintiff's presence in the hospital. Two doctors moved for summary
judgment supported by affidavits in which each doctor denied that he had
knowledge of the presence of the plaintiff until after receipt of the court
order of commitment. This order was received within a few hours after
the plaintiff arrived at the hospital. Plaintiff filed no opposing affidavits
contradicting the doctors' assertion of lack of knowledge, nor did plaintiff
resort to discovery devices. Instead an argument was made, based on
Arjstein v. Porter, 3 that the moving affidavits were insufficient be-
211. 131 Cal. App. 2d 349, 280 P.2d 541 (1955).
212. 95 F. Supp. 605 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd, 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
213. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
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cause they were self-serving, and because the facts were peculiarly
within defendants' knowledge. Hence it was contended that plaintiff
should have the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses in open
court with their credibility determined by a jury in the light of this
examination. The district judge granted a summary judgment. He
pointed out that the results of an adverse examination under Rule 43 (b)
would be speculative and that the application of the directed verdict test
(which was analogized to a motion at the end of the plaintiff's case)
to the facts presently before the court would result in a decision for the
defendants. The court also indicated its belief that the defendants' story
could not be challenged, and that, in any case, the plaintiff had two years
in which to attack that story by use of the discovery procedures.
This judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeals.214 In the
first place, that court held as a matter of law that the doctors were not
liable for the interim detention under the circumstances of this case.
Secondly, the court ruled that there was no genuine issue of fact. By
implication, the court agreed with the district judge that in this case
there was no right to rely on cross-examination of the defendants when
no attempt was made to utilize discovery procedures.
Thus unlike Arnstein v. Porter21 and the cases considered previously,
the court in the Shook and Brickmnan cases accepted the proof offered
by the defendant, shifted the burden of presenting evidence to the plain-
tiff, and required him to produce sufficient competent evidence to show
the existence of a good cause of action. Is there any justification for this
particular method of decision? If there is, it must be found in the position
of the defendant in moving for summary judgment, as compared to that
of a plaintiff upon whom the procedural law imposes the burden of proof.
When a plaintiff moves for a summary judgment and the court decides
that the proof offered in support of the motion is either quantitatively or
qualitatively inadequate, there is no reason to look to the opponent's proof
because the plaintiff is entitled to judgment only if his own proof is
legally sufficient. On the other hand, the defendant may win a lawsuit
either because his proof is so persuasive that the court resolves issues of
credibility in his favor, or because the plaintiff's proof is inadequate to
establish a prima facie case. Thus when a defendant produces credible
evidence that substantiates a negative defense, the court may be justified
in requiring the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence to show that a
cause of action exists. This approach permits a court to justify a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant either because the court believes that
214. 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
215. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
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the issues of credibility may be resolved in defendant's favor as a matter
of law, or because the court requires the plaintiff to present at the hearing
of the motion proof sufficent to show the existence of a cause of action,
and the plaintiff fails to meet this requirement.
As the Arnstein case shows, Judge Frank fails to differentiate be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, but applies the same principle to both." 6
Thus no disclosure of proof is required of the plaintiff if a question of
credibility is raised by defendant's proof. In Maltby v. Shook,217 and
Orvis v. Brinkman,21  on the other hand, the plaintiff was required to
produce evidence showing the existence of a cause of action and the court
granted an adverse judgment as a penalty for his failure to do so even
though questions of credibility inhered in the defendant's proof.
While such a ruling has considerable merit because of the defensive
posture of a defendant-movant, courts are unwilling to extend the require-
ment of a full disclosure of proof by plaintiffs to all situations. Consider,
for example, a negligence case in which the defendant simply produces
affidavits substantiating his pleaded denials. In Thomas v. Martin.,21
plaintiff pleaded a good claim for negligence which defendant denied.
He moved for a summary judgment, supporting the denials with
affidavits of several persons. These affidavits, if believed, would defeat
the plaintiff's case. The court, in denying the motion, stated that a
summary judgment could not be sustained if there was a substantial issue.
"Affidavits making denial of allegations of negligence clearly set forth
in a complaint are evidence that there exists an issue of fact."22 In other
words, a mere repetition of denials in affidavit form fails to shift to the
plaintiff the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to verify his claim.
In stating that the affidavits demonstrate that issues of fact exist, the
court must mean the credibility of those denials presents issues for trial.
In a similar case, Hanson v. Halvorson,2 21 the Wisconsin court re-
versed a summary judgment for the defendant although the plaintiff
produced no proof establishing the defendant's negligence. The court
ruled that summary judgment is to be denied ". . . where it does not
appear from the affidavits that no circumstances exist that tend to support
an inference of essential ultimate fact contrary to that contended for by
the movant, nor when it does not appear that the conclusive effect claimed
216. See text following note 193 supra, and cases cited note 194 supra.
217. 131 Cal. App. 2d 349, 280 P.2d 541 (1955).
218. 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
219. 8 F.R.D. 638 (E.D. Tenn. 1949).
220. Id. at 63&
221. 247 Wis. 434, 19 N.W.2d 882 (1945).
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for the affidavits by the movant cannot be destroyed by cross-examina-
tion." 2
Suppose instead of a simple verification of denials in such cases,
the defendant resorts to the full panoply of discovery devices. Such was
the method of attack employed by the defendant in Didansky v. Iowa-
Illinois Gas & Electric Company 3 Plaintiff sought to recover damages
in a wrongful death action, alleging that a bus operated by the defendant's
employee struck and killed the plaintiff's intestate. After extensive pre-
trial discovery proceedings, defendant moved for a summary judgment
on the basis of affidavits, interrogatories, and admissions tending to
establish that the decedent had not been struck by the bus, but had fallen
under it. In granting the motion, the court stated that the party opposing
the motion must ". . . disclose the existence of facts which genuinely
controvert the material facts established by the movant." '224 But here not
a scintilla of evidence was produced to show that the defendant had
struck the plaintiff's intestate, and if a scintilla had been produced, "...
under Iowa law even a scintilla of evidence is not enough to make an issue
for the jury."2 5 If this record had been submitted to an Iowa court, a
directed verdict for the defendant would have to be granted at the close
of the plaintiff's case. No triable issue was presented here because even
if the defendant's evidence were disbelieved, the plaintiff had failed to
produce sufficient evidence to get to the jury.
The interesting premise in the district court's decision is its statement
that when the defendant makes a full disclosure of his evidence contro-
verting negligence, plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to get to a
jury or lose. Credibility is ruled out as an issue because the burden
of producing evidence is shifted to the plaintiff who at this point must
produce evidence sufficient to avoid a directed verdict or lose irrespective
of defendant's proof.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for the defendant for
two reasons. 2 6 First the court believed that the evidence submitted by
the defendant was open to varying interpretations and a jury might
reasonably infer that the accident was not the result of a fall, but that the
boy was struck by the bus. Moreover, the evidence of the defendant's
driver and the sole passenger was submitted in the form of affidavits,
and the court ruled that the truthfulness of their assertions ought to be
tested by cross-examination. Second, the burden of proof was on the
222. Id. at 437.
223. 10 F.R.D. 566 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
224. Id. at 577-78.
225. Id. at 579.
226. 191 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1951).
A RATIONALE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
movant (the defendant) and not the plaintiff, to show that there was no
genuine issue of fact for trial, and this was not clearly established. Thus
the Court of Appeals focused its attention on the defendant's burden of
proof without considering the adequacy of plaintiff's own proof. The
court ruled that from defendant's proof an inference of negligence could
reasonably be drawn, or in the alternative, that such proof was in-
sufficient to" establish the non-existence of a fact issue. As a result, the
burden of producing evidence never shifted to the plaintiff, and there-
fore the insufficiency of his proof was not significant.
Obviously, the decisions in these three cases did not follow the
principle of the Shook and Brickman cases. Instead of granting judg-
ment for the defendant because of the failure of the plaintiff to produce
evidence establishing the existence of a prima facie case, the court directed
its attention to the defendant's proof and denied judgment because that
proof failed to measure up to the standards applied by the court.227 Why
the court chose not to apply the method of decision used in the Shook and
Brickman cases is the significant question, since an ability to shift the
burden of producing evidence to the plaintiff offers a defendant an
exceptional opportunity of success on a motion for summary judgment.
Before attempting to answer this question, the precise nature of the
inquiry involved should be clarified. In the cases under examination, the
defendant failed to avoid objectional credibility issues by the use of
documents, admissions, or other accepted devices, but instead presented
testimonial evidence of interested witnesses in support of the motion.
The plaintiff, in opposing the summary judgment, failed in all of these
cases to present evidence establishing the claim, but only in the Shook
and Brickman cases did the court proceed beyond the defendant's support-
ing evidence to question the adequacy of the plaintiff's proof. Thus the
liroblem is to discover if the latter two cases are in some way distinguish-
able from the Thomas, Halvorson, and Dulansky cases.
Postulating a full disclosure rule in the jurisdictions deciding the
Shook and Brickman cases would provide an easy answer to the problem,
but unfortunately it is by no means clear that any such simple solution is
227. See also, Albert Dickinson Co. v. Mellos Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.
1950) (trade-mark infringement) ; Vale v. Bonnett, 191 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(negligence) ; William Goldman Theatres v. Twentieth-Century, 151 F. Supp. 840 (E.D.
Pa. 1957) (anti-trust action) ; Austin Theatre v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 139 F. Supp.
727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (conspiracy to restrain distribution of films) ; Hoffman v. Babbitt
Bros. Trading Co., 203 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1953) (abuse of process) ; Judson v. Peoples
Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954) (fraudulent conspiracy) ;
see Galanis v. Proctor & Gamble Corp., 153 F. Supp. 34, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (misap-
propriation of an idea) ; cf. Carantzas v. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.
1956) (declaratory judgment of liability pursuant to an insurance policy); Smith v.
Mills, 123 Colo. 11, 225 P.2d 483 (1950) (breach of contract).
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consistently supported by the cases in these jurisdictions.2 2 The answer
must therefore be sought in the nature of the cases themselves. In both
cases, plaintiff's success in the litigation depend upon his ability to pro-
duce evidence establishing facts that were within the peculiar knowledge
of the defendant, and in both cases, the defendant categorically denied by
affidavit or deposition these material facts. There are unmistakeable
indications in the Shook and Brickman cases that the court believed that
under these circumstances, considering the fact that no controverting
proof was presented, plaintiff would be unable to prove his case. On
the other hand, in the Thomas, Halvorson, and Dudansky cases, it was
never established by the defendant that plaintiff would have any diffi-
culty in presenting evidence supporting his claim. Defendant's evidence,
if believed, merely supported an inference that he was not negligent.
A much more difficult case to distinguish is Surkin v. Charteris,2 "
since that case involved an accident similar to the one litigated in the
Dulansky case. In the Surkin case, the defendant moved for a summary
judgment on the basis of affidavits tending to prove that the bicycle on
which the plaintiff was riding struck the car driven by the defendant,
and that the plaintiff fell against the vehicle sustaining the injuries that
were the basis of the action. Defendant's testimony that he was struck
by the plaintiff was not controverted by other testimony nor by the
circumstantial evidence of the collision. In affirming a summary judg-
ment for the defendant, the Court of Appeals stated that ". . . it is true,
as contended by the appellant, that the moving party's affidavits may
disclose such issues [of fact] but, in the instant case, we think the
defendant's affidavits affirmatively disclose there is clearly no issue as
to any material fact and that the defendant was not negligent in any
particular and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."2 ' Having ac-
cepted the adequacy of defendant's proof, the court characteristically
rationalized the result by shifting its attention to the plaintiff's proof,
stating that ". . . the opposing party [the plaintiff] must sufficiently
disclose what the evidence will be to show that there is a genuine issue
of fact to be tried. 23 1
Why did the court in the Surkin case exact from the plaintiff pre-
cisely what the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to require in the
Dulansky case? The distinguishing factor again appears to be the court's
belief that the plaintiff could not prove negligence in the Surkin case
228. See the California cases cited notes 80, 81 supra, and Dewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d
766 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
229. 197 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1952).
230. Id. at 79.
231. Ibid.
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because he ran into the defendant. The circumstantial evidence supported
this conclusion, whereas in the Didausky case, the court found conflicting
inferences possible on this precise issue. Thus the evidence offered by
the defendant in the Dulausky case, even if believed, failed to convince
the court that the accident occurred without negligence, and hence the
court never proceeded to a consideration of the inadequacy of the plain-
tiff's controverting proof.
The success of the defendant in these cases thus appears to turn upon
his ability to produce sufficiently convincing evidence to show the court
that the plaintiff will probably be unable to sustain his burden of proof
at a trial. The absence of evidence in support of the claim confirms the
court's judgment and compels the conclusion that no benefit is to be
gained from postponing the disposition of the case until trial merely to
permit the plaintiff to default for lack of proof at that time.2"
The determination of the s.ufficiency of defendant's evidence for
this purpose manifestly involves a nice question of judgment. Whether
the nature and.type of action commenced by the plaintiff influences a
court in making that judgment presents a problem worth investigation.
No such distinction was found in the cases examined previously where the
proponent of the issue was the moving party since the policy against
resolving issues of credibility raised by testimonial proof is pervasive.
In the cases presently under consideration, however, issues of credibility
are not involved, but instead, the question is whether the court should
grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment in a particular case
because of the plaintiff's failure to present substantiating evidence.
Wrongful death actions provide a useful starting point for this
inquiry. The favorable judicial attitude toward such actions is indicated
by the rule that ". . . in a death case a plaintiff is not held to as high a
degree of proof of the cause of action as where an injured plaintiff can
232. Compare the following cases in which defendant was granted a summary
judgment with the cases cited note 227 supra. Wilkinson v. Powell, 149 F.2d 335 (5th
Cir. 1945) (F.E.L.A.) ; Appolonio v. Baxter, 217 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1954) (oral con-
tract to make a will) ; United States v. 31 Photographs, etc., 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) (forfeiture for obscenity) ; United States v. 373.70 Carats of Cut, Etc. Diamonds,
148 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (forfeiture); United States ex rel. Ryan v. Brod-
erick, 59 F. Supp. 189 (D. Kan. 1945) (qui tant action) ; Johnston v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp.
345 (D.D.C. 1957) (malpractice) ; Fontenot v Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 144 F. Supp.
818 (W.D. La. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1957) (workmen's compensation
act coverage) ; Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947) (libel) ; Continental
Cas. Co. v. Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 281 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1955) (breach of
warranty); Holland v. Lansdowne-Moody Co., 269 S.W.2d,478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
(conversion) ; Brown v. Navarre, 64 Ariz. 262, 169 P.2d 85 (1946) (joint tenancy);
Holcomb v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 224 (Ct. Cl. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 935
(1956) (claim for back pay); cf. Carantzas v. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., supra note 227
(dissenting opinion).
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himself describe the occurrence. '"2 33 One way of furthering this policy is
to deny summary judgment motions at the instance of the defendant even
though plaintiff fails to present evidence in support of the claim. While
there are cases, including Dulaisky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Com-
pany,23 4 which may be regarded as supporting such a rule, there are also
situations in which a defendant can succeed on a motion for summary
judgment nothwithstanding the favorable treatment accorded the plain-
tiff, as will be seen shortly.2" ' Compare with these cases actions of fraud
where a strict burden of proof is imposed on the plaintiff.2 6 Despite
the fact that the plaintiff fails to present any evidence, a court may deny
summary judgment for defendant merely to preserve for the plaintiff the
right to "probe the conscience of the moving party." 27 In other fraud
cases, the nature and persuasiveness of defendant's proof is such that
plaintiff's failure to produce evidence will result in a summary judgment
for the defendant.228
Consider finally a stockholders' derivative suit. Such actions are
not regarded with favor by courts or legislatures,23 and this attitude is
reflected in the quantum of proof required of a plaintiff to succeed in
these actions.24° Implementation of this policy in summary judgment
cases would take the form of a requirement that plaintiff substantiate his
233. Noseworthy v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 76, 80, 80 N.E.2d 744, 746 (1948) ;
cf. Whitaker v. Borntrager, 233 Ind. 678, 122 N.E.2d 734 (1954) ; Note, MORGAN, MA-
GUIRE, AND WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 433 (4th ed. 1957).
234. See note 226 supra. See also Estepp v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 192 F.2d 889 (6th
Cir. 1951) ; Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R. Co., 135 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1943).
235. McGuire v. McCollum, 116 A.2d 897 (Del. 1955), infra note 249. Cf. cases
where plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur to establish negligence and the court rules that
the doctrine is inapplicable. Johnston v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp. 345 (D.D.C. 1957) ; San-
ders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Tex. 1939). Lauchert v. American
S.S. Co., 65 F. Supp. 703 (W.D.N.Y. 1946) illustrates the use of the "category" system
to defeat recovery in a death action See note 148 supra.
236. Johnson v. Johnson, 172 N.C. 530, 90 S.E. 516 (1916).
237. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24
(1954) ; Loew's, Inc. v. Bays, 209 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1954). Compare the opinion of
the district court and the court of appeals in Sarnoff v. Ciaglia, 165 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.
1947), reversing, 7 F.R.D. 31 (D.N.J. 1947).
238. Knoshaug v. Pollman, 148 F. Supp. 16 (D.N. Dak. 1957), af'd, 245 F.2d 271
(8th Cir. 1957). Cf. Melioris v. Morgenstern, 269 App. Div. 1028, 58 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1st
Dep't 1945) (plaintiff conceded that he had no proof). These two cases illustrate situa-
tions in which defendant does not rely solely on testimonial evidence, but succeeds in
shifting the burden of producing evidence to the plaintiff by the presentation of ad-
missions or documentary evidence.
239. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York,
32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944) ; Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholders' Deri-
vative Suits, 42 COLUm. L. REV. 574 (1942) ; Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders'
Derivative Suits, 47 CoLum. L. REV. 1 (1947).
240. Hays, A Study of Trial Tactics: Derivative Stockholders' Suits, 43 COLUm.
L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1943) ; Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum Co., 174 Misc. 601,
679-83, 21 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd, 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934
(1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
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pleading allegations with evidence in order to defeat the motion. There
are cases taking just that position, 41 but this attitude toward stockholders'
suits may conflict with other and more fundamental policies. Since a
plaintiff relies largely on evidence drawn from the defendants in these
cases, some courts, and particularly the Second Circuit, find in this factor
a sufficient reason for denying summary judgment to a defendant even
though the plaintiff fails to produce evidence substantiating his claiim"
at the hearing of the motion.242
Thus support in the cases for the proposition that the imposition of
the duty to produce evidence depends upon the type of case is incon-
clusive. Other factors may be equally or more important in determining
whether a court will turn to an examination of the plaintiff's proof.
Thus the existence of facts within the peculiar knowledge of the de-
fendant may have the effect of precluding a summary judgment just as
in cases considered previously where a proponent had exclusive knowl-
edge.243 This is true even in cases where a strict burden of proof is
imposed upon the plaintiff and notwithstanding the fact that he has failed
to produce any evidence in support of the claim. The curious feature of
the Shook and Bricknwn cases is that this factor had quite a different
effect and was influential in convincing the court that the plaintiff would
be unable to prove his claim and that a trial would therefore serve no
useful purpose.244 In the Surkin case, on the other hand, evidence of the
accident was not within the exclusive possession of the defendant but was
equally available to the plaintiff. Shifting the burden of explanation to
the plaintiff was based on the court's conclusion that the defendant's
version of the accident, verified by the circumstantial evidence supplied
by the point of impact, raised a sufficient doubt as to the negligence of the
241. Wohl v. Miller, 145 N.Y.S.2d 84, 89 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Diamond v. Davis, 38
N.Y.S.2d 103, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dep't
1942), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 552, 54 N.E.2d 683 (1944) ; Dickheiser v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 5
F.R.D. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808
(1947) ; Lopata v. Handler, 37 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Okla. 1941) ; Rolfe v. Swearingen,
241 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (class action) ; cf. Martin Foundation v. Phillips-
Jones Corp., 280 App. Div. 981, 116 N.Y.S.2d 468 (2d Dep't 1952); Abrams v. Allen,
36 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 835, 42 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1st Dep't
1943) ; Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155
F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Mullins v. De Soto Securities Co., 45 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. La.
1942), ree'd inz part, 136 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1943).
242. Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883
(1955), 40 MiNN. L. REv. 608 (1956) ; Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660
(2d Cir. 1948) ; Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949) ; see Toebelman v. Missouri-
Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3d Cir. 1942).
243. See notes 109, 113 supra.
244. See also Green Bay Auto Distributors v. Willys-Overland Motors, 102 F.
Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1953) ; but cf. Loew's, Inc.
v. Bays, 209 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Bellak v. United Home Life Ins. Co., 211 F.2d
280 (6th Cir. 1954).
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defendant to exact evidence from the plaintiff sufficient to show the
existence of issues for trial.
Thus the nature and reliability of the defendant's proof, the failure
of the plaintiff to present supporting evidence in the particular type of
case before the court, and the peculiar or exclusive knowledge of the de-
fendant are all factors to be evaluated in determining the disposition of
the motion. Opinions will differ as to the weight or effect to be given
to the various factors in a particular case, but the basis of the decision
to grant a summary judgment to the defendant in these cases remains con-
stant: the court is convinced that the plaintiff will be unable to prove
the claim at a trial.
Instead of merely producing evidence tending to establish the plain-
tiff's inability to prove a claim as in the cases just considered, a defendant
may go further and establish conclusively that evidence on a material
issue is unavailable to either party. Again, as a consequence of the burden
of proof rule, judgment must be entered for the defendant and against
the plaintiff. Zampos v. United Smelting, Refining and Mining Co. ,2-
is an excellent example of this situation. Plaintiff sought to recover for
damage caused to his property by floodwaters from the defendant's mine.
In the complaint, it was alleged that the water accumulated in the mine
as a result of defendant's negligence. In moving for summary judgment,
defendant proved by affidavits and depositions that the mine was
abandoned, that defendant's mine was but one of a number of aban-
doned mines in the area, that there were over six hundred miles of
tunnels and hundreds of openings, that it was impossible to inspect this
particular mine because of physical conditions, and that no similar flood
had ever occurred. Considering this evidence, the Court of Appeals
stated that if the case ". . . had been tried to the court or a jury and
evidence had been introduced tending to establish all of the facts set
forth in all of the affidavits and depositions, the cause or contributing
causes of the flood, or the source from which the flood water came,
would have been solely a matter of speculation or conjecture."1211 Just
as in the Surkin case, the court added that ". . . where the moving party
presents affidavits, or depositions, or both, which taken alone would
entitle him to a direct verdict, if believed, and which the opposite party
does not discredit as dishonest, it rests upon that party at least to specify
some opposing evidence that he can adduce which may reasonably change
the result. ' 27  (Emphasis added.)
245. 206 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1953).
246. Id. at 175.
247. Id. at 174.
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The explanation for the court's scrutiny of the plaintiff's proof is
found in the factual situation that gave rise to the litigation, and which
was admitted.248 There were a number of mines, and it was physically
impossible to inspect the tunnels. Admittedly the fact of causation could
not be proved by the plaintiff, and would remain speculative. This pre-
vented the plaintiff from establishing his claim, and obviated the necessity
of a trial. Thus in the Zampos case, the admitted facts of the occurrence
established conclusively that the plaintiff could not sustain his burden
of proof.
A more striking case illustrating the court's reliance on this factor
is McGuire v. McColluv 249 Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action
against defendant for the death of her husband who was struck on the
highway by a car driven by the defendant. There were no eyewitnesses
except the defendant who testified that he was driving his car about
fifty miles per hour and was passing another car when he suddenly saw
decedent two or three feet directly ahead of the left headlight. Although
the brakes were applied immediately, defendant was unable to avoid
striking the decedent. This version of the events was uncontradicted
and was supplemented by police reports. There were no witnesses to the
decedent's movements prior to the accident. In ordering a summary judg-
ment for the defendant, the court held that even if defendant had been
speeding, there was no evidence to show that speed was the cause of the
accident. Since the burden of proving causation was on the plaintiff, the
court ruled that a trial in this case would place a useless burden on the
parties because lack of evidence left the issue of causation speculative.
In this case ". . . all known witnesses have been fully examined and
cross-examined; every known fact is in the record; no material contradic-
tions have been pointed out; and no evidence has been developed upon
which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."2 '
The McGuire case again confirms the significance of the burden of
proof rule and the defensive position of the defendant in moving for a
summary judgment. It was unnecessary for the court to accept the
defendant's version of the accident in order to grant the motion for
judgment. Of paramount importance was the admitted fact that no
witness could be produced to establish causation. The decisions in the
Zampos and McGuire cases have the effect of shifting the burden of
248. In less peculiar circumstances, the 10th Circuit has little difficulty in discover-
ing an issue of fact. See in particular Avrick v. Rockrnont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568
(10th Cir. 1946) criticized by Melville, Suoninary Judgment and Discovery: The
Amended Rules Will Add to Their Usefidness, 34 A.B.A.J. 187, 189-90 (1948).
249. 116 A.2d 897 (Del. 1955).
250. Id. at 901.
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producing evidence to the plaintiff, since the judgment is based on the
insufficiency of the plaintiff's proof. Yet the court focuses its attention
on the plaintiff's proof (or absence of it) because evidence developed by
the defendant and admitted by the plaintiff establishes conclusively that
necessary proof of material facts in the claim will not be available.
A court may be persuaded to examine the adequacy of the plaintiff's
proof in still another situation developed by the defendant's supporting
evidence. Rather than establishing the unavailability of evidence, as in
the two prior cases, defendant may present in support of the motion the
testimony of all witnesses to the transaction. If all of the available
evidence is flatly contradictory to the material allegations of fact con-
stituting the plaintiff's claim, a decision as matter of law seems possible.
Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff brings an action for slander claim-
ing that defendant told A and B that plaintiff was a blackmailer. Plain-
tiff, having the burden of proof, calls as witnesses the defendant, who
denies that he said the alleged defamatory words, and A and B, who deny
that they heard the words. Is defendant entitled to a directed verdict?
An issue as to the credibility of the witnesses' testimony is certainly
raised. The trier of the facts need not believe defendant or A or B.
Logically, if they disbelieve the witnesses, they must believe that the
words were spoken and heard. May a disbelief of witnesses supply the
proof plaintiff needs to establish his case? Unlike the situation where
a disbelief of proponent's witnesses results in a decision against the pro-
ponent, the question raised here is whether a disbelief of the only wit-
nesses of the occurrence may be used to prove the proponent's case. The
courts have ruled that in such a situation the defendant is entitled to a
directed verdict or its equivalent in court tried cases. "Mere disbelief of
denials of facts which must be proved is not the equivalent of affirmative
evidence in support of those facts.
'2
1'
The facts stated above were involved in Dyer v. MacDougall,
'5 '2
where defendant moved for a summary judgment on the basis of
affidavits and depositions denying the slanderous words were spoken or
heard. Summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed. Judge
Learned Hand conceded that the demeanor of witnesses is part of the
evidence, and that a finding that testimony is false may be a finding of
the truth of the contrary of the story. Nevertheless, at trial a verdict
would have to be directed against the plaintiff, for otherwise there could
251. Cruzan v. New York Central & Hudson River R.R., 227 Mass. 594, 116 N.E.
879 (1917). See also cases cited in 1 MOORE, TREATISE ON FACTS OR THE WEIGHT AND
VALUE OF EVIDENCE, op. cit. supra note 95, § 131, at 177-78 (1908). Note, MORGAN,
MAGUIRE, AND WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 406-08 (4th ed. 1957).
252. 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952).
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be no effective review of the trial judge's disposition of defendant's motion
for a directed verdict for the reason that the denial of a directed verdict
in such a situation is based solely on demeanor evidence and this evidence
disappears on the appeal. Since an appellate court has only the record, the
decision of the trial judge must be supported by the record. Here, on the
record, there.is of course no affirmative evidence whatever for the
plaintiff.
Judge Frank, in a concurring opinion, rejected Judge Hand's opinion
for two reasons. First, Judge Frank believed that Judge Hand's rule
made distinction between a jury and a court-tried case, and that as a
result, the judge's power to grant a summary judgment might vary de-
pending upon whether the case was to be tried by a court or a jury.
Judge Frank found such a distinction unwarranted by Rule 56. Second,
he believed that the directed verdict test excluded from the judge's power
the right to pass on credibility. In passing on a motion for a directed
verdict, the judge assumes that the jury will believe all evidence including
demeanor evidence, favorable to the opponent of the motion. Thus there
is no basis in directed verdict practice for Judge Hand's distinction,
since demeanor evidence is not a factor in the disposition of these motions.
Judge Frank refused to adopt an "invariable rule" that a defendant
is entitled to judgment (apparently either by motion for a directed verdict
or summary judgment) in cases where plaintiff can only offer as evidence
the testimony of defendant which is "flatly and unswervingly against
the plaintiff" because the judge or jury may be convinced that the de-
fendant is a liar. In this case, however, the alleged slander was denied by
the defendant and the two persons whom plaintiff asserted had heard it;
and plaintiff's own suit publicized the slander. "In these peculiar circum-
stances, the plaintiff should not have the chance at a trial to discharge
his burden of proof by nothing except the trial court's disbelief in the
oral testimony of witnesses all of whom will deny that the alleged slander-
ous statement was made." '253
Two comments may be made about these opinions. The ruling of
Judge Hand that the decision of the trial judge on a motion for a directed
verdict must be supported by the record should not be interpreted to mean
that a ruling as a matter of law must be made for a plaintiff solely because
his affirmative proof is uncontradicted. Such a rule has never been
applied to directed verdicts,25 and, as has been demonstrated, certainly
does not apply in the disposition of a motion for summary judgment.
253. Id. at 272.
254. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Daviess, 243 Ky. 356, 47 S.W.2d 990 (1932) ; cf. Kelly
v. Jones, 290 Ill. 375, 125 N.E. 334, 8 A.L.R. 792 (1919). See-authorities cited note28
supra.
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In the concurring opinion, Judge Frank argues that there should be no
"invariable rule" against finding for the plaintiff under the circumstances
of Dyer v. MacDougall, but he fails to cite cases which permit a plaintiff
to win without presenting affirmative evidence proving the material facts
of the claim. It is exceedingly doubtful if any such cases can be found.
A review of the cases thus reveals that when a defendant moves
for summary judgment on the basis of testimonial evidence supporting
negative defenses courts have been willing to shift their attention to the
plaintiff's proof in three types of situations: [1] cases in which the
defendant produces evidence sufficient to convince a court that plaintiff
will probably not be able to establish his claim at a trial; [2] situations
in which defendant conclusively establishes that proof of a material fact
is not available to either party; and [3] where defendant produces all
of the evidence available and that evidence is completely disprobative
of the material facts constituting the claim.
Differentiation of the cases in the first group from those in the
second turns on the fact that in the latter cases, the movant establishes
to the court's satisfaction at the hearing of the motion that evidence in
support of some material fact in the case is unavailable to the plaintiff.
While this may be true in fact of cases in the first group, it is not
established at the hearing of the motion. If the physical facts of the
occurrence permit an inference favorable to the plaintiff," or if defend-
ant's evidence does not conclusively establish the unavailability of proof,
the case is not properly classified in the second group. Nevertheless, the
evidence may be sufficiently convincing to persuade a court to require
the plaintiff to present evidence in support of the claim; in other words,
the case might still be classified in group one.
More difficulty is experienced in distinguishing the third group of
cases from those in the first, as may be seen from a comparison of the
facts in Dyer v. M1acDougall with Orvis v. Bricknan. The basis of dis-
tinction lies in the fact that in the third situation the defendant produces
all of the evidence that is available to either party to establish the facts.
No such showing is made by the defendant in the first group of cases,
as may be seen from defendant's proof in the Shook and Brickman cases.
Undoubtedly the proof of defendant is convincing, since the court does
require the plaintiff to substantiate his case, but it does not purport to be
all of the evidence that is available to establish the material facts.
A court may require disclosure of evidence from a plaintiff in one
or more, but not all, of the three situations listed above. Infringement
255. Cf. Whitaker v. Borntrager, 233 Ind. 678, 122 N.E.2d 734 (1954).
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cases offer a neat illustration of the differences that may then result.
Suppose plaintiff brings an action for a declaratory judgment that its
patent does not infringe defendant's patent, and alleges in the complaint
that defendant, through its agent X, stated to Y, a customer of the
plaintiff, that defendant intended to institute a lawsuit against plaintiff
and its customers for infringement. If defendant moves for summary
judgment on the basis of affidavits of both X and Y denying the con-
versation, a situation similar to the Dyer case results.256 Summary judg-
ment for the defendant would be entered by courts recognizing either
the first or third categories.
Suppose instead, the plaintiff alleges the following: "That plaintiffs
are informed and believe .'.. that defendant, through its employees
and agents, has .informed the trade and prospective customers of plain-
tiff, . . . that the composition coating produced by plaintiff . . . con-
stitutes an infringement of said patent . . . and that litigation would be
instituted by defendant against plaintiff . . . or its customers for
infringement of such patent. " Defendant moves, for summary
judgment on the basis of eleyen affidavits. Ten of the affidavits 'are
made by defendant's officers who deny making the threat of an infringe-
ment action against plaintiff, and the eleventh affidavit states that these
ten men are the only persons who could have made such a threat. No
controverting evidence is presented by the plaintiff. Is a genuine issue
of fact raised for trial? In this situation, the District Court in Direet
Proprietary, Ltd. v. Industrial Metal Protectives, Inc.,25 denied summary
judgment on the basis of the rule enunciated by the "Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in the Hart case. It is interesting, however, to speculate what
the reaction of Judge Frank and Judge Hand would be, since the affiants
were interested witnesses, and the defendant failed to produce evidence
from plaintiff's customers denying that the threat was communicated.
Considering the generality of the allegations in the complaint defendant
undoubtedly was unable as a practical matter to secure such evidence,
but as a result the case clearly falls without the rationale of the Dyer
case.2"' On the other hand, courts adhering to the policy of the first cate-
gory of cases as exemplified by the Shook and Brickman cases could find
the defendant's proof sufficiently persuasive to require positive proof
in support of the claim in order to defeat a summary judgment
The Dimet case also affords an instructive insight into the relation-
256. Cf. Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraf Corp., 169 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1948),
reversing, 73 F. Supp. 146 (D. Del. 1947). See discussion note 174 su pra.
257. 109 F. Supp. 472 (D. Del. 1952).
258. Cf. Hoffman v. Bobbitt Bros. Trading Co., 203 F.2d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 1953),
where the court distinguished the Dyer case on this precise ground.
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ship existing between generalized pleading and the motion for summary
judgment. Insofar as generalized pleading is authorized by rules of
procedure, and summary judgment is restricted as in the Dimet or Dyer
cases, the defendant's opportunity to terminate the litigation prior to
trial is narrowly limited. Lack of specificity in the pleading will be
regarded as "not a fatal defect" subject at most to a motion to make more
definite.25 On the other hand, if the court is skeptical of the existence of
a valid claim and regards the generalized allegations as based merely on
suspicions and conjecture, the motion for summary judgment can be used
as a device for compelling particularization of the claim by the presenta-
tion of evidence. The stockholders' derivative suits illustrate this use of
the procedure,"'0 and there are other cases.2 '
Cases in which a defendant moves for summary judgment on the
basis of negative defenses thus reveal that the same problems of credi-
bility plaguing proponents are met and that the same techniques for avoid-
ing these issues are utilized. In addition, the operation of the burden of
proof rule affords courts an opportunity for granting summary judg-
ments based on the inadequacy of the plaintiff's proof. No court seems
to have adopted a policy of requiring a plaintiff to make a disclosure of
evidence sufficient to substantiate the cause of action in every case,2"2
but instead, courts require defendant to present facts establishing or at
least indicating that plaintiff will be unable to prove his claim at a trial.
The adoption of a full disclosure policy has merit, since unlike a plaintiff,
a defendant may always get a favorable judgment solely because the
plaintiff has failed to shoulder his burden of establishing a prima facie
claim. Requiring the plaintiff to disclose the factual basis of his claim
thus provides an opportunity for finally settling the litigation without
the delay and expense of trial.26 Since the plaintiff is only expected to
show that there is a genuine factual basis for the claim, the danger of
depriving a worthy litigant of trial is minimal.264 While the presentation
of proof in every such case may burden the plaintiff with additional ex-
259. Austin Theatre v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 139 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
260. See note 241 supra.
261. See cases cited note 232 supra, particularly United States ex rel. Ryan v. Brod-
erick, 59 F. Supp. 189 (D. Kan. 1945); and Wilkinson v. Powell, 149 F.2d 335 (5th
Cir. 1945).
262. Although as mentioned earlier, in some states the motion may be used as a
substitute for a defective discovery procedure. See note 125 supra.
263. In the Dyer case, an argument can be made that it would have been less ex-
pensive for the defendant to proceed to trial.
264. "The party who would carry the burden of proof at the trial is obliged, in
resisting the motion, to demonstrate only that his claim is backed by admissible evidence
in those particulars specifically singled out by the moving party." Clayton v. James B.
Clow & Sons, 154 F. Supp. 108, 112 (N.D. 11. 1957).
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pense, the disclosure that results may eliminate or at least mitigate equally
costly discoVery proceedings that are commonly employed in preparing
for trial, and if a trial is ultimately avoided, a saving of money may
actually be effected.
CONCLUSION
A review of the evolution and development of the summary judg-
ment procedure reveals that enthusiasm for a speedy settlement of suits
has always been restrained by the accepted principle of Anglo-American
procedure that proof of issues of fact shall be by witnesses in open
court subject to cross-examination. The decisions reached in the cases
demonstrate the extraordinary concern of courts to safeguard the right
to trial, however much this basis of the decisions may be 'obscured by
constant repetition of vague generalizations, meaningless formulas, and
talismanic words. Concern for this right first manifested itself by the
restriction of summary judgment to certain limited classes of cases be-
cause it was thought that in these cases the need for a trial could be
easily determined: -With -the advent-of -an-unlimited summary 'judgment
procedure, the unjust deprivation of trial is avoided by imposing a burden
on the moving party of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of
fact for trial.
The message of the decisions for a party preparing a motion for
summary judgment is plain and unmistakeable. His task is to convince
the court that his statement of the case represents the actual facts of the
transaction or event generating the litigation. Hence he has the burden
of establishing the credibility of his evidence to a degree calculated to
induce a court to conclude that a trial would be a useless formality. A
moving party sustains this burden most successfully when he is able to
substantiate his case with documentary evidence. Courts willingly accept
such evidence because a trial is not considered worthwhile merely to
present authenticating witnesses. If testimonial evidence is required
either exclusively or in addition to documentary proof to establish ma-
terial facts, the movant must face up to the rule that the credibility of
such evidence is ordinarily determined only after a trial. Thus some
method must be devised for removing issues of credibility in the support-
ing proof and establishing the resulting wastefulness of a trial. Summary
judgment may also be granted to a defendant relying on negative defenses
because of the failure of the plaintiff to present evidence substantiating
the claim at the hearing of the motion. If this possibility is not available,
and if issues of credibility cannot be removed, summary judgment will
not be granted, and unless the procedure is to be used as a substitute for
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discovery or simply as a delaying tactic, it had best be forgotten.
Since the summary judgment procedure is thus restricted to situ-
ations where it can be shown that there are no issues of fact deserving of
trial, the area in which the motion operates is an exceedingly narrow one.
In speedily settling spurious litigation within that area, the effectiveness
of the summary judgment procedure is a matter of history. Without
denying for a moment its usefulness and importance, the boast that it is
the "most effective weapon in the arsenal of legal administration" '2 65
seems hard to reconcile with any realistic appraisal of the procedural
scheme. Courts still consider the conventional mode of trial a superior
technique for resolving factual issues. All efforts to substitute for trial
the hearing of a motion for summary judgment have been frustrated.
Since courts have refused to extend the procedure beyond its narrow
confines, the role of summary judgment in the battle against court con-
gestion is necessarily a minor one. Major reliance must be placed on
other procedures and other methods if much needless delay in the final
disposition of litigation is to be avoided.
265. Sheintag, Summary Judgment, 4 FoRDHA,! L. REv. 186 (1935).
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